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Abstract 
Norad’s Oil for Development (OfD) programme is set for renewal in 2015, a year where the 
petroleum industry is recovering from the largest sustained fall in oil-prices since 2008/2009. 
In light of these developments, this thesis seeks to examine the link between oil-prices, and the 
ability of oil-exporting countries to develop its local content in the petroleum industry. The 
literature on local content has been focused on the domestic factors that influence local content 
development. This paper however, contends that this focus on domestic factors somewhat 
neglect the influence that the external environment has on the ability of these factors to 
contribute to local content development. The most notable external factor in this regard being 
oil-prices, which reflect not only the global supply and demand for oil, but also profitability in 
the industry as a whole.  
Through this qualitative case study of Angola, which has been one of the OfD programmes 
“core” recipient countries, this paper examine the link between oil prices and local content 
development. This is done by looking at how a decline in oil-prices affect the macroeconomic 
environment in the country, and how this environment influence domestic investment and 
development. The main findings suggest that a drop in oil-prices does indeed affect the 
macroeconomic environment, in a way that limits Angola’s ability to develop local content in 
the petroleum industry.  
This topic is relevant for several reasons. Firstly, it provides decision-makers in oil-exporting 
countries with an extra dimension when considering the shape of future local content policies. 
Secondly, this insight into the effects of oil-price fluctuations in Angola might help to improve 
the assistance to similar countries provided by petroleum-related aids programs, such as the 
OfD programme, in years to come. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The question of how to achieve economic and industrial growth is one of paramount importance 
for every state. This is especially true for resource-rich developing countries, who have great 
potential for growth due to their resource endowment. However, with great resource 
endowment follows great government responsibility. Building a sustainable domestic economy, 
while efficiently making use of a country’s natural resources, is a project riddled with potential 
pitfalls. The vast number of traps associated with extracting natural resources for the purpose 
of economic growth, have given name to a phenomenon known as the resource curse. The term, 
resource curse, is a reference to what seems to be a correlation between states being rich in 
natural resources and underachieving in terms of economic growth. This seemingly inescapable 
problem has inspired a considerable literature, not only on the causes, but also on the possible 
policy measures governments could adopt to escape the curse, and to stimulate growth in the 
face of a vast resource endowment. 
When we focus on petroleum resources, we are looking at resources that require a very capital-
intensive industry with the potential for very high profit margins. The nature of the petroleum 
industry has led countries endowed with large petroleum resources to become susceptible to 
what the literature has dubbed Dutch disease. The presence of Dutch disease is, if not the most 
common, then perhaps the most often-mentioned potential negative effect from a large resource 
windfall. Dutch disease essentially is the “failure of resource abundant economies to promote 
a competitive manufacturing sector” (Sharraf & Jiwanji 2001: 4). The literature identifies a few 
typical signs of the disease. Among these are the resource movement effect, which is the transfer 
of resources from other sectors of the economy to the resource sector (Corden and Neary 1982). 
This effect typically manifests itself through the transfer of labour and production from the 
tradable- to the non-tradeable sector. Related to this effect, is the spending effect, where a 
resource boom increase demand in the non-tradeable sector. This demand is then met by an 
increase in imports, so resources are transferred from the tradeable sector to non-tradeable 
sector (Sarraf & Jiwanji 2001: 4). Lastly, there is the leapfrog effect, which is when 
industrialization skips the labour intensive phase and goes straight to heavy capital-intensive 
industry (Ibid). This leapfrog effect is considered to be a trademark of resource-rich developing 
economies. By skipping the labour intensive phase, these countries leave their manufacturing 
sector neglected and unable to pick up the slack for the more volatile resource sector. The reason 
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why this is a problem attributed mainly to resource-rich countries is, quite simply, because for 
a period they can afford it. 
 Richard M. Auty (1994) emphasized how resource endowments determine a state’s industrial 
policy. While resource-poor countries switch from a self-sufficient to a competitive industrial 
policy rather quickly, resource-rich countries have sometimes taken a much longer time to 
achieve industrial reform (Auty 1994). By having a large amount of natural resources that 
generate revenue, resource-rich countries naturally do not experience the same need for a labour 
intensive industry as resource-poor countries. This might encourage resource-rich countries to 
invest in heavy industry too soon (Ibid). The bottom line is that Dutch disease refer to an 
overdependence on the natural resource sector that depresses development of the manufacturing 
industry. In light of the price volatility on natural resources, this overdependence on the 
resource sector leave these economies particularly vulnerable to the effects of fluctuations in 
the price of their resources. 
One of the most effective ways that governments can make natural resources work towards 
achieving industrial- and economic growth, is by enacting policies that ensure that the revenue 
created from extracting these resources is invested in the domestic industry. In the case of states 
with a large resource endowment, the goal of such policies is often to increase the domestic 
participation in the extraction and trade of these resources. In this way they can establish 
industrial linkages with other areas of the country’s economy, through increased domestic 
demand. The term for policies aimed at creating domestic participation in a domestic industrial 
sector is local content policies (LCPs). 
1.1 Research question, and the papers structure 
This paper will focus on how governments can contribute to local content development in the 
petroleum sector, and how this ability is influenced by the price of oil. The theory chapter will 
elaborate on why petroleum-producing countries aim to develop their local content, how they 
use regulations to achieve this goal, and how external factors might influence local content 
development. The theory chapter also presents the theory behind multinational companies’ 
choice of investment location, to give an understanding of why they choose to invest in a new 
market. Lastly, I present Kazzazi and Nouri’s (2012) conceptual model for local content 
development in the petroleum industry. This model presents us with four variables internal to a 
resource producing country, which are essential for successful local content development. 
These four variables are local policies, local infrastructure, local environment, and local 
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capabilities. The four variables in the conceptual model are drawn from what the local content 
literature has highlighted as necessary factors for the successful development of local content. 
The theory of local content development emphasise how domestic development is created 
through regulations aimed at attracting investment in local companies and labour. I therefore 
contend that the conceptual model leaves out the effect that the oil-price has on local content 
development, through the effect it has on investment activity in the industry. The petroleum 
industry is dependent on the hydrocarbons they are in the business of extracting, and 
consequently are inclined to invest where these resources are located, in spite of factors that 
might deter investment from other industries. However, in addition to being tied to the locations 
where hydrocarbons are found, the dependency of oil and gas makes the industry at the mercy 
of the market price of these resources. A high price of oil and gas means that the profit margins 
are high, which would cause increased investment in the industry, while a low price would have 
the opposite effect on investment. Thus, I argue that the global price of oil affects petroleum-
producing countries ability to develop its local content, through the influence it has on the 
investment climate.  
My research question is then: How does a fall in global oil-prices affect the ability of petroleum 
producing countries to develop local content in the petroleum industry? 
The aim for the paper is to improve upon Kazzazi and Nouri’s (2012) conceptual model for 
local content development. Their stated goal for developing the conceptual model was to 
provide a set of considerations for policy makers aiming to develop their local content in the 
petroleum industry (Kazzazi & Nouri 2012: 2174). Since the oil-price essentially represents 
variations in global supply and demand, I believe that by adding an exogenous resource price 
variable, the conceptual model gains another dimension. A dimension that might be helpful to 
policy makers who intend to consider the factors that influence local content development in 
the petroleum industry. 
In this paper, I have tested the effect that a drop in oil-prices has on an oil-exporting country’s 
investment climate through a case study approach. By looking at how the Angolan petroleum 
industry was affected by the decline in oil-prices in 2014, and comparing this to the effects of 
the previous price-fall in 2008. The reasoning behind the choice of case is that Angola is one 
of the core countries of the Norwegian Oil for Development program (OfD), and hence its 
resource management model is loosely based on the Norwegian model. This makes it interesting 
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from a Norwegian standpoint, as it provide us with some insight into both the transferability of 
the Norwegian model, and how the OfD-programme has been able to contribute to a sustainable 
resource management model. However, with its focus on local content regulations, the Angolan 
management model most resembles how the Norwegian model looked prior to Norway entering 
the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994.  
Recently, the OfD-programme’s commitment to Angola and its other beneficiaries is in the 
process of being renewed, and the global price of oil has declined dramatically in the last year. 
Thus, this case study might serve a broader purpose as an example to other developing oil-
producing countries, with ambitions to adopt a variation of the Norwegian management model, 
of how the price of oil affect local content development.  
Besides its role in the OfD-programme, the Angolan case contains certain criteria vital to my 
hypotheses. Firstly, it has regulations that particularly emphasize that the petroleum industry 
should make use of local content. This means we could expect there to be a significant level of 
added costs from regulations on the foreign actors in the industry. With membership in the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) becoming ever more prevalent, many developed oil-
producing countries are effectively barred from enacting such encompassing protectionist 
policies.  
Secondly, the country has petroleum resources that are technically demanding to extract, which 
means that petroleum production in Angola require a high degree of expert input from the 
established international actors in the industry. This makes the importance of foreign 
investment relatively high, compared to areas with shallow-water- and onshore production.  
Lastly, through their special provisions in the WTO, developing countries often have significant 
added costs on the industry, because the WTO’s least developed country (LDC) clause give 
them the opportunity to enact protectionist regulations. This means that investing companies 
face added costs from regulation and smaller profit margins, which in turn would increases their 
sensitivity to price fluctuations in these markets. 
Together, these criteria make Angola a good case to illustrate the effects of oil-price volatility 
on local content development, in a developing oil-producing country.  
The methods chapter goes into further detail about the considerations related to choice of 
research design, and data collection for this thesis. Here I present the main sources of empirical 
data informing the analysis in chapter 5, and give an introduction to the industry informants 
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that I interviewed in the research process. This methods chapter will also provide some insight 
into the challenges and methodical considerations the researcher was faced with in the process 
of writing this thesis.  
In chapter 4, I present the data for how Angola’s petroleum industry has been affected by oil-
price fluctuations, by focusing on the four areas highlighted in Kazzazi and Nouri’s (2012) 
conceptual model. This is to see how the fall in oil-prices have affected the four variables in the 
model. I begin by looking at how the country’s macroeconomic environment was affected by 
the decline in oil-prices in 2008, and how it has responded to the current price fall. This way, I 
am able to see how the country’s macroeconomic environment is influenced by oil-price 
fluctuations. I then go on to look at how the three remaining variables in the conceptual model 
(local policies, local infrastructure, and local capabilities) contribute to local content 
development, and how this ability is influenced by the changes in the macroeconomic 
environment. 
In the analysis, in chapter 5, I look at how the changes in the macroeconomic environment 
affects each of the variables in the conceptual model, and how this influences their ability to 
contribute to local content development in Angola. The data used to assess the impact of price 
fluctuations on these variables, are drawn from my interviews with representatives for two 
international companies operating in Angola’s petroleum industry, and several independent 
databases. From this analysis, it becomes apparent that the price of oil has indeed a major impact 
on the investment climate in Angola.  
By looking at how the drop in oil-prices in 2008 affected macroeconomic variables that 
influence foreign investment, I find that there is reason to expect that the current oil glut will 
cause a fall in private investment. Perhaps more significant, is that the 2014 fall in oil-prices 
have caused a clear drop in public investment as well. Overall, we see that the decline in oil-
prices cause a deterioration of the investment climate in the petroleum industry. Furthermore, I 
find that the Angolan government responded to the deteriorating investment climate by 
removing some of the added cost on the industry. Specifically, the government have eased up 
on some of the local content obligations imposed on certain international actors in the petroleum 
industry, in a bid to improve the investment climate.  
As for the four variables in the conceptual model, I find that a decrease in oil-prices negatively 
influences their ability to contribute to local content development in the petroleum industry. 
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Specifically, a drop in prices affects the macroeconomic environment by deteriorating the 
exchange rate of the local currency. This in turn increases production-costs and reduces the 
competitiveness of the domestic petroleum industry. The drop in state revenue puts limits on 
the ability of the country’s industry and infrastructure to contribute to local content 
development, because it leads to reduced public spending in these sectors. This has removed 
necessary funding from projects aimed specifically at increasing the efficiency- and capacity of 
the domestic industry. Lastly, I find that by deteriorating the investment climate, a declining 
oil-price has in some instances, impeded the government’s ability to impose local content 
regulations on established international actors. However, due to the limited sample-size 
available and the single-case nature of this study, this impact on regulation will have to be 
explored further. 
So to summarize; in this paper, I found the oil-price to affect the four variables in the conceptual 
model. More specifically their contribution to local development, through the oil price’s effect 
on the petroleum industry’s profitability. Thus, I conclude that the effect the oil-price has on 
the investment-level in the petroleum industry, should be considered as an external variable in 
Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Chapter 2. Theory 
This chapter focuses on the theory behind local content development. The first part of this 
chapter looks at how local content is defined by the literature, and how local content 
development has both direct and indirect benefits to the domestic economy. This is to illustrate 
the importance of local content development as a means to achieve domestic growth. In this 
first section, I also present different theoretical arguments for the state to impose regulations on 
the use of local content, and the different regulatory tools petroleum producing countries use to 
promote local content. The second section, gives a more in-depth description of Kazzazi and 
Nouri’s conceptual model, as it explains the different elements contained in their four variables, 
and how they contribute to local content development. The third section of this chapter looks 
at the theory behind the investment strategy of multinational corporations. This is to establish 
a set of conditions, which I find to influence corporate behaviour in relation to investment. This 
allows me to make certain assumptions about how macroeconomic variables will affect 
investment from international companies in the petroleum industry. 
In the fifth and final section of this chapter, I draw from these assumptions to formulate four 
hypotheses about how the price of oil affect the four conceptual model variables. Specifically, 
these hypotheses look into how each variable’s contribution to local content development is 
influenced by a drop in oil-prices. 
2.1 What is Local content 
What qualifies as local content depends on how one chooses to define it. Different countries 
focus on different aspects of local participation when they measure local content. Where one 
country might have a strict definition, limiting local content to procurement among local 
companies, others define local content more simply as a certain percentage of local employment 
(Tordo et al 2013: 79).  Regardless of how one choses to define local content, a high degree of 
local participation, in both production- and supply sectors of the petroleum industry, has long 
been an explicit goal for most petroleum-producing nations. The overarching aim of the 
different local content regulations (LCRs) found around the world, is to create a minimum level 
of foreign investment in the economy of the resource holding state. The use of LCRs rests on 
the premise that the local industry is not sufficiently competitive compared to the international 
competition, and thus needs a protective policy to compete with foreign investors and to attract 
investment. This goal of transforming resource-wealth into domestic development continues to 
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be at the centre of attention for resource holding states around the world, who seek to extract as 
much value as possible from their hydrocarbon resources.   
2.1.1 The benefit of developing local content   
What this paper refers to as direct local content, is the local employment created by the sector. 
By substituting imported labour with domestic labour, one makes sure that wages are used in 
the domestic economy. This input creates an increase in demand in the local economy that could 
be met by domestic suppliers, creating jobs and spreading the wealth throughout a society. 
Secondly, as this aids the domestic industry, one stimulates the substitution of imported goods 
with domestically produced goods, which in turn creates added value, such as increased 
domestic employment and demand.  
The second form of local content are what this paper refer to as indirect local content. The local 
content literature refers to this as local content that promotes local development (Tordo et al 
2013: 2-4). As opposed to the direct understanding of local content, indirect content will 
enhance a nation’s industrial and technological capability in addition to employment. One 
example of indirect local content benefits could be employing nationals in management or 
engineering departments of large corporations. Where they would receive training and 
experience, which in turn could be put to use in the domestic industry. A way many petroleum-
rich countries have tried to secure local development through regulations, is to give oil 
companies different incentives to invest in local research and development (R&D) (Tordo 2013: 
xv).  
 The benefits from securing such technology-enhancing investment could potentially far exceed 
those derived from merely achieving a certain amount of domestic labour participation. 
Domestic development of R&D, and administrative- and technical know-how, could be 
harvested to gradually increase the competitiveness of the domestic industry in relation to the 
established actors. Several petroleum-rich countries have been able to build on knowledge-
transfers from the petroleum industry, resulting in big state oil companies and internationally 
competitive supply companies. Examples of this development can be found in countries as 
diverse as Malaysia and Norway. Where the government’s local content policy has been aimed 
at eventually obtaining the knowledge to be able to operate independently of the major oil 
companies, to great success. Both countries today have big state (majority owned) oil 
companies in Petronas (Malaysia) and Statoil (Norway), which are at the forefront of their 
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domestic petroleum industry (Wade Locke 2004: 35-36) (Ibid: 50). Government policy may 
require oil companies to make use of domestic suppliers as far as they can be qualified as 
competitive by some criteria, and in some cases not even that. State owned oil companies also 
have the added benefit of being able to ensure that the local industry is being considered, on 
better or equal terms, with the foreign competition in the awarding of contracts and concessions.  
2.1.2 Developing local content 
The success of the petroleum management model of a country like Norway, in attracting foreign 
investment and local development, has caused several other resource-rich states to implement 
similar regulations and create similar management models. The aim of these management 
models is to make the extraction of resources beneficial to the resource holding state. This is 
done by creating incentives for local employment, in addition to establishing the transfer of 
technology and experience between established international actors and the local industry. For 
the purpose of illustrating to governments of petroleum producing countries how the local 
content literature finds certain internal factors influential in local content development, Kazzazi 
and Nouri (2012) created a conceptual model of local content development. 
2.2 Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model for local content 
development in the petroleum industry 
Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model is based on four domestic variables that the literature of 
local content development highlight as vital to the successful development of the domestic 
petroleum industry. They argue that the importance of these variables to local content 
development has been established through a series of studies on the issues related to local 
content. Here I present the literature that informed the development of their conceptual model.  
Hausmann & Rodrik (2006), highlighted the complexity of the factors decision-makers are 
faced with when creating policies aimed at efficient management of economic activity. They 
suggest that public policy often tend to overlook important aspects that might be obvious to 
private actors. This might cause local content regulations to create unnecessary inefficiencies, 
and added costs in the industry. The study by Klueh et al. (2009), focused on how the 
government of a resource-holding state can increase domestic participation by implementing 
efficient policies. This include local content regulations, which secure a minimum amount of 
local participation. Heum et al. (2011), took at broad approach to analysing Uganda’s petroleum 
resource management. They highlighted the need for the country’s government to provide 
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sound macroeconomic management, credible regulations, and infrastructure, in order to create 
linkages between the local companies and the international petroleum industry.  
Tordo et al. (2011), stressed the importance of creating forward linkages in the petroleum 
industry, such as establishing local refineries. This way the domestic industry becomes involved 
in more than just the upstream activities of the petroleum industry. Nwokeji (2007), studied the 
evolution of Nigeria’s National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), with focus on the problematic 
aspects of public management of the country’s natural resources. In relation to local content, 
Nwokeji found the advance of western education to enhance local participation in the petroleum 
industry. Nordås et al. (2003), investigated how the petroleum sector could benefit industrial 
growth in Nigeria. They found local content regulations to add costs on the industry, which 
reduce investment activity- and the production capacity in the upstream oil and gas sector. 
However, the LCR’s do assist in attracting foreign investors and international companies, which 
opens up for cooperation and technology transfers between local and foreign companies.  
Klueh et al. (2007), looked into São Tomé and Principe’s ability to adopt local content measures 
that have been used in other developing oil-exporting countries. They stress the importance of 
creating realistic local content targets, and that government policy should be directed towards 
increasing domestic participation in sectors where local actors can contribute. Cusumano & 
Elenkov (1994), looked into the nature of international technology transfers. They found that 
the ability of a company to absorb technology from more advanced firms was influenced by the 
company’s existing technical capabilities. In local content terms, this highlights the need to 
develop local capabilities for more advanced participation. 
In summary, these studies provided Kazzazi and Nouri (2012) with four domestic variables that 
they found to influence how successful states are in developing its local content. These are: (i) 
local policies, (ii) local infrastructure, (iii) local environment, (iv) local capabilities (Kazzazi & 
Nouri 2012: 2165-2167). By developing all four of these variables in a way that is attractive to 
private investment, they believe that a country would be effective in creating local content 
development. This means developing efficient infrastructure, competitive local suppliers, 
industry regulations that does not put too much strain on industry profitability and an 
environment that provide macroeconomic incentives for private business activity. 
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However, if these variables are not properly developed, the expected outcome will be that the 
domestic industry will have a hard time attracting foreign investment, resulting in poor 
conditions for local development.  
Figure 1. Conceptual model of how local conditions affect local development (Kazzazi & Nouri 
2012: 2167) 
 
2.2.1 Local policies 
These are local policies and regulations intended to create incentives for domestic participation 
in the petroleum industry, such as the establishment of company registers, enforcing contracts, 
and aligning infrastructure development with local content goals (Ibid: 2169). Kazzazi and 
Nouri argue that government policies should stress cooperation between the government and 
foreign companies in decisions regarding local purchasing, as this will secure better 
opportunities for the local industry. Additionally, an industrial policy that is conducive to 
domestic industrial development should be focused on enabling industrial linkages between 
local industry and international investors (Ibid: 2169). They stress the fact that a local policy 
has to take into account how regulations will affect other sectors of its economy, as protectionist 
policies might enhance growth in the domestic industry, but adversely affect trade.   
2.2.2 The local infrastructure  
The local infrastructure contributes to local content development through enhancing domestic 
competitiveness. This it does by satisfying the needs of both the international- and local industry 
related to information technology, local industrial capabilities, social- and educational 
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standards. Kazzazi and Nouri also highlight how some analysts recommend establishing an 
office dedicated to creating opportunities for local companies. The goal of such an office is to 
enable three specific measures: (i) developing a registry of qualified local vendors, (ii) advise 
locals on potentials for joint ventures and other cooperative mechanisms with foreign 
companies, and (iii) support plans for capacity building, training and local R&D development 
(Ibid: 2169). The development of the local infrastructure creates an environment that either 
enhances or retracts from the competitiveness of the domestic industry. A well-developed 
infrastructure will then attract foreign investment, and through this investment enable 
technology transfers between the local industry and the more established international actors 
(Ibid: 2170). 
2.2.3 The local environment 
The local environment is the macroeconomic environment where all these factors come 
together, and its structure shape how they are developed. Important factors in this regard is the 
exchange rate for the local currency, and the interest rate. Both of these affect private 
investment decisions by affecting the cost- and return of investment. Kazzazi and Nouri (2012) 
include this variable since the resource curse literature have found that countries need to 
develop their institutional structure and macroeconomic management, if they are to avoid the 
dangers related to resource endowment (Ibid: 2170). Especially countries with petroleum 
resources needs to create an attractive investment climate, if they wish to develop a competitive 
local industry. A failure to encourage competitiveness could result in the development of a 
culture for inefficient practices, which are often associated with protectionist policies. 
2.2.4 Local capabilities 
Kazzazi and Nouri include local capabilities as the last variable in their conceptual model. This 
is because local capabilities such as education-level, experience, technological development, 
and management capabilities, have an effect on how local content regulations are shaped. This 
is because a country’s capabilities set the limits for which kind of services the local industry 
can realistically supply. LCRs should encourage cooperation between domestic and foreign 
companies, in the expectation that collaborating with internationally leading competence will 
provide positive impulses for domestic industrial development (Ibid: 2170). For the domestic 
industry to be able to learn from these foreign companies, it is crucial to have an effective 
education system and an industrial infrastructure to build on (ibid). Unfortunately, for 
developing oil-exporting countries, this need for knowledge-transfers is often coupled with a 
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limited level of local capabilities. This inhibits cooperation in more advanced segments of the 
industry, causing a challenge to the improvement of more technologically advanced capabilities 
(Ibid: 2171).  
2.2.5 Lessons from the conceptual model 
The conceptual model shows how local content development will depend on a country’s 
development within each of these variables, and how the local environment structures the 
interaction between them. The goal of local content development in the petroleum industry is 
also dependent on a resource holding country’s ability to create linkages between the petroleum 
related industry and the other sectors of the economy. This will contribute to economic 
diversification. Diversification is needed if the goal is long-term growth and not just short-term 
domestic participation. The recipe for success in local content development requires these 
different variables to be conducive to both foreign and domestic investment, as investment is 
the necessary ingredient to expand domestic capacity and growth (Ibid: 2171).  
In essence, Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model shows how important these internal variables 
are in attracting investment, and how important that investment is to local content development.  
2.3 Theory of multinational companies’ investment strategy 
We have now seen how LCRs are essentially government tools used on foreign companies to 
make them invest in domestic industrial development. These regulations have to be 
comprehensive enough to make it unattractive not to invest, but at the same time, they need to 
avoid (negatively) affecting the company’s bottom-line. To identify this bottom-line, we need 
to know what motivates the large international petroleum companies to expand into a new 
market. The theory of multinational companies’ (MNCs) investment strategy provides insight 
into the basic logic behind their decision to expand into a new market. The strategies listed 
below are what the literature on MNC investment identifies as the most common strategies 
behind investing in a new market. 
2.3.1 Market-seeking 
In this strategy, the MNCs invest in a particular country in order to supply that country’s market. 
Typically, this is a response to trade limitations on the supply of that market from its current 
location (Dimitropoulou et al 2008: 61). In the case of the large international oil companies 
(IOCs) in the petroleum industry, this strategy would be more focused on capturing market-
shares than market supply, as they supply the global market. Meanwhile, for the supply 
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companies operating in the petroleum industry, protectionist measures favouring domestic 
suppliers would be a limit to their ability to supply the IOCs. This is the strategic logic behind 
supply companies establishing themselves in foreign markets. This is especially true when it 
becomes quite costly to operate from outside the market, as LCRs limit their ability to compete 
for contracts without significant local investment in both domestic industry and employment.  
2.3.2 Efficiency-seeking 
As profit maximising entities, MNCs are looking to establish production subsidiaries in 
locations that will help enhance the cost-efficiency of the goods they supply (Ibid: 64). This 
can be achieved by moving a labour-intensive part of production to a location where labour is 
cheap. The supply segments in the petroleum sector that rely on low-skill and labour-intense 
input, are less dependent on the local capability to supply necessary technical input than more 
hi-tech segments. This makes them more flexible in terms of where they choose to locate their 
production, and by establishing production subsidies closer to markets, these companies will 
increase their overall cost-efficiency. In contrast, for those segments who supply capital- and 
skill-intense products, there are higher requirements in terms of local technological and 
educational development. Investment in less developed countries by technology-heavy 
segments, such as subsea technology, is counter-intuitive to this efficiency seeking strategy. 
2.3.3 Knowledge-seeking 
In this strategy, MNCs seek to invest in countries where they can benefit from location-specific 
capacities, such as an advanced R&D environment, or to diversify their technological capacity. 
This knowledge-seeking strategy is most commonly employed by R&D-heavy industries, 
where new technology has a greater impact on their product (Chung & Alcácer 2002: 1536). 
The investment of MNCs like FCM technologies and Schlumberger in the Norwegian subsea 
and engineering segments can be seen as an example of knowledge-seeking strategy. Since the 
Norwegian petroleum industry has years of experience with offshore and deep-water 
operations, which require a high degree of technical input. This advanced Norwegian R&D 
environment is traditionally supported by both the government and industry, and has in recent 
years developed an expertise in floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) (Rystad 
2013: 5).  
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2.3.4 Profit-seeking 
What all of these strategies have in common, is that the goal of investment is maximizing the 
company’s profits, which is the motivation for any market-oriented company. Host-government 
regulation of MNC activity will then add additional costs that may end up affecting the eventual 
profit margin of this investment. Dunning (2002) points to a few examples of how government 
policy that is designed to contribute to domestic development could cause a less attractive 
investment climate for MNCs. One such example is how demanding more labour intensive 
production to increase domestic employment could cause exports to suffer. Because as the 
expenses grow, the rate of production might go down. A second example is how limiting the 
MNC’s ability to use its international affiliates for supply functions might increase the cost of 
production. A third example, is where a government pushing for increased R&D investment 
might be reluctant to give up ownership of the technology, discouraging private actors from 
participating (Dunning 2002: 201). As the principle motivation of the MNC’s activity is 
creating profit, it would be safe to assume that government policies that are found to negatively 
affect the MNC’s profit margin will make the country a less desirable target for investment. 
In addition to increasing the cost of investment, such protectionist policies are, according to 
Dunning, less likely to attribute real domestic development. Because MNCs already rarely find 
it profitable to transfer technologically advanced- and skill-intensive manufacturing to new 
markets. This trend of not investing in the expansion of technologically advanced tasks and 
R&D is found to be a general logic amongst MNCs, especially those based in the U.S. (Dunning 
2002: 205). This means that MNC-investment in new markets are usually directed towards 
labour-intensive- and low-skill manufacturing, which is comparatively more expensive in more 
advanced economies due to the higher wage level. Most countries benefit from FDI through the 
way it helps increase their technological- and managerial ability. It is then apparent that any 
country enacting LCRs on the petroleum industry, would have to be careful not to deter foreign 
established actors, and at the same time secure investment in the development of domestic 
capabilities. 
The increased importance of international sourcing, attributed to the globalized nature of the 
modern economy, has made MNCs more dependent on the established knowledge base and 
good infrastructure, than natural resources (Dunning 2002: 309). This corporate logic of 
infrastructure development trumping natural resources might not transfer too well to an industry 
as innately resource dependent as the petroleum industry, but it does give an indication of the 
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importance MNCs put on having a functioning infrastructure as a prerequisite for their 
activities. 
2.4 The oil price’s influence on profitability in the petroleum industry 
There is however one factor, which neither the conceptual model or the literature informing it 
deals with explicitly, that is the effect that the resource price has on local content development. 
When assessing how public policy can attract investment from MNCs, it is important to map 
out all the variables that will affect their investment decisions. As we have seen from the 
literature reviewed in Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model, a number of internal factors in 
the recipient country influences these investment decisions. However, I argue that for extractive 
industries, like the petroleum industry, the price of oil and gas serves as an important external 
variable influencing investment in the industry. This is because a drop in the market price for 
crude oil will lead to decreased profit margins for the companies operating in the petroleum 
industry. 
Declining profit margins makes the petroleum sector a less attractive target for outside 
investment. Especially, in countries that already have added costs on the industry in the shape 
of comprehensive regulations and/or high-cost production. Less investment in the petroleum 
industry would mean fewer opportunities for domestic participation. This way, I argue that the 
oil-price affect local content development as an external variable, through the effect it has on 
the macroeconomic factors influencing investment decisions in the petroleum industry. From 
here on, I use the term “investment climate” when referring to the macroeconomic and financial 
conditions in a country that affect whether businesses are willing to invest there. 
It could be argued that other external variables, such as the global supply and demand for 
energy, and in part, regional stability, are captured in this oil-price variable. This is because the 
global supply and demand for oil ultimately determine the oil-price. Furthermore, the price of 
oil arguably influences regional stability, by either strengthening the legitimacy of the current 
regime through high investment activity, fuelled by high oil-prices, or attributing to social 
unrest and discontent in a low-price scenario, as corporate expenditure contracts.  
As previously mentioned, reduced profitability leads to reduced investment activity. Small 
profit margins will then influence local investment of the petroleum industry in two ways. 
Firstly, with smaller profit margins the added costs of government regulation will be more 
significant for the oil companies, which deteriorates the domestic investment climate by 
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decreasing profitability. Secondly, with a low oil-price the oil companies are less likely to invest 
in exploration of new areas and production from high costs fields that would otherwise be 
profitable in a high-price scenario (World Bank 2015a: 160). As in any industry, large profits 
fuel investment and declining profits leads to cutbacks. Therefore, when the oil-price took a 
dramatic fall in the second half of 2014, it had severe repercussions for the investment climate 
for the operators- and suppliers in the petroleum industry.  
2.4.1 Causes behind the drop oil-prices in 2014 
The 2014 fall in oil-prices can be attributed to a glut in oil supply, similar to the one the industry 
experienced in 1986. With the introduction of alternative fuels and improved vehicle fuel 
efficiency, there has been a decrease in the global demand for oil, which bottomed out in 2014 
(IEA 2015: 5) (The Economist 2014). In addition to the fall in demand, progress in fracking 
technology has since 2007 attributed to a major surge in U.S. production of shale oil. 
Figure 2. Timeline of U.S. production of crude oil (EIA 2015) 
 
The increase in domestic production means that the U.S. is able to satisfy a large part of its own 
demand for oil. For oil-exporting countries outside North-America this has a major impact on 
demand, as the U.S. market is by far the largest consumer of crude oil in the world, averaging 
19 million barrels a day, which is almost double that of China, the world’s second largest 
consumer (EIA 2013: Chart). Like in the 1980’s, the increase in production from new sources 
and declining global demand is contributing to the current glut. However, unlike 1986, this time 
around OPEC has not taken measures to try to push up the oil-price. While they lowered 
production in an attempt to keep the price up in the 1980’s, they now maintain high production-
levels in a bid to keep their market-share (El Gamal et al 2015). 
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2.5 The link between external factors and local content development 
As we have seen in this chapter, the literature on local content development in the petroleum 
industry highlights the need of resource holding states to help create linkages between the 
established international actors and the domestic industry. The purpose of these linkages is to 
enable transfers of experience, technology, and administrative expertise between the 
established international actors and the domestic industry. As the local industry acquires the 
relevant skill and technology, the capacity and demand of the local industry grows, spreading 
the benefits of increased economic activity and employment throughout the domestic economy. 
In the petroleum industry, these linkages are formed when international operators or supply 
companies invest in the local industry. This is done by either establishing a corporate 
partnership with a local partner, or by contracting the services of local companies. Such linkages 
might only occur naturally if conditions make the local industry an attractive target for 
investment. Alternatively, the government might force their creation, by imposing LCRs when 
the local conditions are unconducive to attracting investment. 
Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model gives us four domestic variables that are highlighted by 
the local content literature, as having a large influence on how attractive a country is as a target 
for foreign investment. As we saw in the previous sections, these four variables are the: (i) local 
environment, (ii) local infrastructure, (iii) local policies, and (iv) local capabilities.  
However, as effective local content development require foreign investment, the resource 
holding state becomes vulnerable to external variables influencing the investment climate. As 
mentioned, petroleum-producing countries experienced a dramatic decline in oil prices in the 
summer of 2014. This was caused by an increase in the supply of oil, as developments in 
fracking technology enabled the U.S. to increase its production of cheap shale oil. This decrease 
in oil-prices has especially affected the segments of the petroleum industry that operates in 
capital-intensive markets, by significantly reducing their profit margins. Looking at how the 
theory tells us that MNCs motives for investment are mainly profit-driven, we can expect a fall 
in oil prices to cause a reduction in investment activity. This reduction in investment will 
consequently affect local content development, as it reduces local investment and thus the 
possibility of knowledge-transfers between the foreign- and domestic industry. 
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2.5.1 Testing the link between oil prices and local development 
If there is indeed a direct link between the price of oil and the ability of the resource holding 
state to develop its local content, it should be included as a fifth variable in the conceptual 
model. In order to see if there is such a connection, we need to test the theoretical assumptions 
that lead us to believe that there might be one. The first assumption is that a drop in the price 
of oil influence macroeconomic variables in the oil-exporting country, in a way that has a 
negative effect on investment the petroleum industry. The second is that the resulting 
investment climate will have a negative impact on the resource holding state’s ability to create 
local content development. 
2.5.1.1 Operationalization and hypotheses 
Testing the first assumption require us to look at how the oil-price influences public and private 
investment. This I do by looking at how a fall in oil-prices affect the macroeconomic 
environment. Kazzazi and Nouri (2012), highlight the macroeconomic environment as the 
factor included in their “local environment” variable, which has the greatest effect on 
investment in the petroleum industry. They shows us how macroeconomic variables, such as 
the exchange rate, inflation rate, and interest rate, have a large influence on the domestic 
investment climate. By looking at how these macroeconomic variables are influenced by 
declining oil prices in Angola, we are able to see whether low oil-prices deteriorates the local 
investment climate. If this assumption turns out to be true, then we would expect to see low oil-
prices being followed by a depreciation of the local exchange rate, and possibly a higher interest 
rate, as both the public sector and business are likely to borrow money to make up for the loss 
in purchasing power. These macroeconomic effects discourage investment, as they increase the 
cost of new investments. Reversely, if we fail to see signs of these macroeconomic effects we 
would expect this assumption not to be true. This implies that we expect the oil-price to have a 
direct effect on the local environment, and through this effect, have a negative influence on 
domestic investment. 
 This result in our first hypothesis: A fall in oil-prices affect important macroeconomic 
variables in the resource holding state, in a way that deteriorates the domestic 
investment climate. 
From this follows the second assumption, which require us to look at the resource holding 
state’s ability to develop local content. Excluding the local environment variable investigated 
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in my first hypothesis, Kazzazi and Nouri’s model provide us with three additional variables 
essential to developing local content. These are (i) local policies, (ii) local infrastructure, and 
(iii) local capabilities. By looking at how the different aspects of these three variables are 
influenced by the macroeconomic repercussions from a low oil-price, we are able to tell whether 
a drop in the price of oil will affect the country’s ability to develop its local content. This means 
that I expect to find the oil-price to influence local content development indirectly through the 
effect it has on the macroeconomic environment.  
For local policies, this means looking at how these macroeconomic effects influences the 
resource holding state’s ability to impose LCRs on the established industry. The theory of 
obsolescent bargaining tell us, that we would expect to see international companies becoming 
more thoroughly regulated once they have invested in a new location, as sunk costs strengthen 
the state’s bargaining position (Jakobsen 2012: 70). If this deterioration of the investment 
climate, caused by the change in the macroeconomic environment, does not affect the resource 
holding state’s ability to impose LCRs, we would expect to see LCRs on foreign companies 
with sunk costs to either increase or remain at their current level. On the other hand, if this 
deterioration of the investment climate indeed does have an effect on the resource-holding 
state’s ability to impose LCRs, we would expect to see a relaxation of LCRs imposed on foreign 
companies with sunk costs.  
 Resulting in our second hypothesis: The macroeconomic effects from a fall in oil-prices 
will limit the resource holding state’s ability to impose LCRs on foreign companies that 
are established domestically. 
To see whether the local infrastructure’s ability to contribute to local content development 
affected by a drop in investment, we have to look at how infrastructure benefits local content. 
Kazzazi and Nouri (2012) have shown us how the local infrastructure benefit local content 
development, by creating conditions that enhance the competitiveness of the domestic industry. 
The resource holding state creates these conditions by funding efficiency-enhancing projects, 
establishing links between domestic and foreign companies, and subsidising the domestic 
industry. In a low-price scenario, we would then expect the revenue of the resource holding 
state to decline. This would limit its ability to invest in both capacity-improving projects and 
subsidies, leading to reduced local competitiveness. If the ability of the local infrastructure to 
enhance local competitiveness were in fact influenced by the deteriorating investment climate, 
we would then expect to see a halt in government spending on infrastructure projects, and 
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subsidies for the local industry. However, if the ability of the local infrastructure to enhance 
local competitiveness was not affected by a worsening investment climate, we would expect to 
see continued spending on planned projects and existing subsidies.  
 The third hypothesis then becomes; The macroeconomic effects from a fall in oil-prices 
will cause a decrease in government spending on infrastructure and subsidies for 
domestic companies. 
To be able to test whether the local capabilities contribution to local content development is 
influenced by a deterioration of the investment climate, we have to look at how these 
capabilities aid in developing local content. As highlighted by Kazzazi and Nouri (2012), the 
literature on local content development tells us that the domestic level of education and 
industrial capacity are important factors in this regard. We see that the country’s capacity to 
establish corporate linkages between international companies and the local industry is one of 
these factors that contribute to developing local content. Similar to how we expect the local 
infrastructure to be influenced by a deterioration of the investment climate, we would then 
expect local capabilities to be influenced by a drop in public spending. If the local capabilities 
contribution to local content development were indeed influenced by a deteriorated investment 
climate, we would then expect to find a drop in public funding of measures aimed at enhancing 
local capabilities. More specifically we expect to see a drop in public funding of education, 
infrastructure, and measures aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the local industry. 
Reversely, if a deterioration of the investment climate does not influence the local capabilities 
contribution to local content development, we do not expect to see a drop in public funding of 
education and domestic competitiveness. 
 Resulting in our fourth and final hypothesis: The macroeconomic effects from a fall in 
oil-prices will cause a drop in public funding of education and public measures aimed 
at increasing the competitiveness of the domestic industry. 
Assuming I find these hypotheses to be true, I argue that the oil-price’s effect on the local 
environment should be added as an external variable in Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model. 
As it is then shown to influence all four of the models variable’s ability to contribute to local 
content development. This it does directly through the oil-price’s effect on the macroeconomic 
variables, and indirectly through how the change in the macroeconomic variables influence 
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investment in and business regulations. We would then expect the revised conceptual model to 
look something like this:  
Figure 3. Kazzazi and Nouri's conceptual model, revised to include the oil-price variable 
 
In Figure 3, we see that this new variable’s influence on the local environment is added as an 
external variable to Kazzazi and Nouri’s (2012) original model. 
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Chapter 3. Method 
This chapter will look at the methodology applied in this thesis, and discuss the considerations 
that have informed the choice of method. The main sources of empirical data used in this paper 
is also presented here, including my interview informants. In addition to this, the chapter also 
contains the author’s reflections regarding case selection, data collection, and the challenges 
related to method and design when researching this paper. 
3.1 Research strategy and design 
This paper applies a qualitative research design, and makes use of a case study approach to 
answering its hypotheses. The reasons for this are connected to its underlying research question 
and the variables in focus. These domestic variables in the conceptual model are interconnected 
with each other, which complicates a quantitative approach, as we would not be sure that an 
effect on one variable does not happen through its effect on one of the other variables. Thus, a 
qualitative approach allow us to go into more detail, to see how external factors influence each 
variable separately. Qualitative research is associated with an inductive approach to knowledge 
accumulation, as the researcher looks at a few cases and tries to draw general lessons (Tjora 
2012: 26). However, this paper also tries to apply a deductive approach, as it applies a general 
model to its specific case, making this paper contain elements of both induction and deduction.  
As I have already mentioned, this paper applies a case study approach in the attempt to answer 
its hypothesis. The essence of the case study is that it attempts to illuminate a set of questions 
like what, how and why (Yin 2003: 1). This paper focus on (i) what influences local content 
development, (ii) why the external environment plays a part in this process, and (iii) how the 
external environment influences domestic variables, it is then best illustrated by a case study 
approach. The ambition of this paper is to apply, review and improve an existing model of the 
most influential variables that influence the development of domestic participation in the 
petroleum industry. As a single case study, its ability to draw generalizable conclusions is 
limited, but as a part of developing a more comprehensive model the goal is to provide insight 
into an external dimension that is not explicitly stated in the original model. This kind of case 
study is what is referred to as a heuristic case study, which aims to add to a theoretical construct, 
with the goal to improve the validity of the original model (Moses & Knutsen 2012: 140).  
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3.2 Case selection  
The first reason for choosing Angola is that the conceptual model emphasises the importance 
of local policy in developing local content. Due to international trade regulations, very few 
countries have local content regulations that to such an extent favour its local industry as Angola 
does. With this policy variable in place, it allows us to see how the other variables are influenced 
by an external variable in an already regulated environment.  
The second reason for choosing Angola is the country’s connection with the Norwegian model, 
through its participation in the Oil for Development programme. As the Norwegian local 
content management is largely regarded as a success story, one could expect Angola to have 
adopted a management policy, which is similarly conducive to local content development.  
The third reason has to do with the cost of oil production in Angola. To best illustrate a link 
between oil-prices and investment, the case needed to have a high cost of production, so that a 
drop in prices would have the greatest impact on profits. By choosing a country with a low 
production-cost on the other hand, a fall in prices would have a less dramatic effect, and the 
outside influence might be overlooked. 
The fourth and final reason relates to what Angola represents in a broader context. It is a sub 
Saharan African country, with a young population, considerable poverty, and vast petroleum 
resources. As several African countries are in the process of exploring and developing their oil 
and gas resources, using Angola as a case might highlight the potential challenges facing local 
content development in the region. 
Other cases matching some of these criterions, such as Brazil, were considered early on the 
research process, but were dropped due to it already having been used for a somewhat similar 
case study. That case study focused on the constraints that international companies experience 
from local content regulations in Brazil. With that study in mind, I decided to prioritise the 
novelty of making use of a less studied case. There is, of course, a problem with drawing 
universal generalisations from such a specific case study. Since both the production-costs for 
the industry and the use of LCRs vary from country to country, making very few cases identical. 
However, similarities do exist, and I believe many of the conditions discussed in this paper also 
apply for several other African oil-exporting countries. Thus, by improving upon a conceptual 
model, with variables that apply to any country with petroleum resources, I contend that this 
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price-effect is always present, regardless of location. Its effect on local content development 
however, depends on the effect it has on the industry’s profit margin in each separate case. 
3.3 Data collection 
I have made use of two interviews as my main source of data about the experiences of the 
petroleum industry. This is related to the need to discover the petroleum industry’s experience 
with LCRs in Angola, and how these might have changed with the recent fall in oil-prices. I 
assess expert interviews to be the only credible source of information, as the subject is a 
contemporary phenomenon. This means that it is largely undocumented and have not yet led to 
any official change in policy, which would allow an alternative method of measurement. The 
fact that I am looking to capture the industry’s experiences, makes interviews the most suited 
form of data collection in this regard, as interviews capture the detailed subjective opinion of 
the informant (Tjora 2012: 105). The initial goal was draw on a series of interviews with various 
international companies operating in Angola, but time and geographical constraints limited the 
number of available participants. 
The interviews were conducted using telephone and a phone recorder, due to the informants 
being located in Paris, France and Tananger, Norway. As there are restrictions to recording 
phone calls, my plans for conducting these interviews and the handling of the information 
gathered were reported to and verified by Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste AS. 
Conducting interviews over the phone might not always be ideal, as it creates distance between 
the informant and the researcher. As the nature of my questions are business related, and are in 
no way emotionally loaded, I believe it did not complicate the interview. These interviews took 
between 45 minutes to an hour, and were conducted by appointment during working hours to 
make sure that I had the informant’s attention and that they had time to prepare. Both informants 
were informed that the interviews would be recorded and that they had the option of anonymity. 
Both gave their consent to being recorded, and waved the option of anonymity. The interview 
with NCA/Oceaneering were conducted in Norwegian, and subsequently translated into English 
by me. This means that the translation process might affect the way their answers are presented 
in this paper. However, I have tried to translate word-for-word as far as possible. 
The choice of using both interviews and existing databases in the data collection for this paper, 
is related to the need to provide data for several variables. To provide an accurate analysis of 
the interaction between five variables and their influence on local content development, it was 
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necessary to draw on several sources, as there was not one source that could adequately inform 
more than one aspect of the model. I have made use of statistics and policy briefings from The 
World Bank, The International Monetary Fund, and World Economic Forum, to inform the 
assessment of the status of Angolan local content development, and how it has been affected 
by the oil-price in the past. I have conducted interviews with procurement officials in two 
international companies that operate in Angola, in an attempt to capture the international 
petroleum industry’s experience with local content. The necessity of a multi-method approach 
to data collection lends itself to such a case study approach, as it relies on the researcher having 
an in-depth understanding of the case (Tjora 2012: 35). 
3.4 Interviews 
As mentioned, the interviews for this paper required informants who were qualified to answer 
questions regarding procurements decisions and government regulations, in a complex African 
market. As the Angolan regulatory system have different regulations for foreign companies 
operating with an Angolan partner-company and/or in-country manufacturing, and those 
companies operating alone, the decision was taken to interview a procurement officer from an 
international company in both categories. By either being involved with a domestic partner 
company or establishing upstream activity in Angola, some foreign companies already make 
use of a certain level of local content. It is then natural that these companies does not receive 
the same regulatory burden, as foreign companies operating independently of the local industry. 
By choosing to interview a company from each category, the idea was to control for the 
difference in regulatory regimes, and reveal if the companies under two regimes experience 
different effects from the drop in oil-prices. How these LCRs vary according to segment and 
local investment is shown in more detail in chapter four. 
My two informants both operate in the subsea/decommissioning segments of the petroleum 
industry. This means that the main difference between them is how invested they are in the 
local market. In addition to this, these are technology-heavy sub-segments of the industry, 
which make them a good indicator on how the declining oil-price influences international 
companies. As technology-heavy segments are usually where the competence of international 
suppliers are needed. 
The first interview was with the procurement officer from NCA/Oceaneering. This company is 
a merger between the Norwegian company Norse Cutting and Abandonment (NCA), and the 
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multinational company Oceaneering. Their area of activity is in the northern Cabinda territory 
in Angola, where they operate from platforms, and supply services related to abandoning and 
decommissioning oil wells. After several years of international expansion since its founding in 
1999, the company was acquired by Oceaneering in 2011, and is now a part of its Deepwater 
Technical Solutions (DTS) branch (NCA 2015). The company operates without a specific local 
partner company in Angola, and thus is my informant from the category of companies who 
operate independently. 
The second interview is with Subsea7 S.A’s sales manager and marketing director for Africa 
and the Mediterranean. This is one of the world’s largest supply companies operating in the 
petroleum industry. Subsea7 S.A is the result of a merger between Luxembourgian supply giant 
Acergy S.A, and Subsea7 who trace its company history back to Det Søndenfjelds-Norske 
Dampskipselskap (DSND). Subsea7 S.A supply services in every area of subsea operations, 
from engineering and production, to maintenance and decommissioning (Subsea7 2015). In 
Angola, the company supplies the whole range of its subsea solutions through its Sonamet yard 
and their fabrication vessel. The Sonamet yard is located in Lobito, but the company also has 
offices in the capital Luanda. As this fabrication yard is run in partnership with the national oil 
company; Sonangol, Subsea7 S.A is my informant from the companies who operate with a 
domestic partner. 
3.5 Databases 
As previously mentioned, this paper supplements its interviews with statistics and surveys 
supplied by various international organisations. This section will present the main databases 
used in the paper. 
3.5.1 The World Bank – World development indicators 2014 
This is a database of development indicators including statistical indicators for country-specific 
development in health, energy, education, trade, infrastructure, economy. The database is 
updated annually, which makes it is possible to look at timeline data in the World Bank’s own 
statistics browser (World Bank 2015b). In this paper, this database is used as the primary source 
of statistical data related to the country’s macroeconomic variables. 
3.5.2 World Economic Forum – The global competitiveness report 2014-2015 
This is the most comprehensive report of national competitiveness there is. The report includes 
144 different economies, which are ranked in twelve different pillars, representing twelve 
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competitiveness indicators. These pillars are: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic 
environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods and market 
efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, 
market size, business sophistication, innovation. All of these indicators have several sub-
categories, which makes for a detailed report (WEF 2014). The statistics compiled in this WEF-
report were used as a source of data for the development of Angolan industrial- and 
infrastructure capacity. 
3.5.3 The International Monetary Fund – World Economic Outlook Database 2015 
and policy reports 
The world economic outlook database contain macroeconomic data at the individual country 
level. This database is updated annually and provides information about national accounts, 
inflation, unemployment, balance of payments, fiscal indicators, trade aggregates, and 
commodity prices (IMF 2015a). In this paper, this database provide the data for the planned 
future government expenditure. In addition to this database, several IMF reports on changes in 
government policy are also used to fill in the areas not covered by the database. 
3.6 Challenges and reflections on the data collection process 
The challenges connected to researching this paper were related to connecting with qualified 
informants. My initial research design included interviewing as many as possible of the 
companies connected to the Norwegian petroleum industry who are currently operating in 
Angola and Brazil. The aim was to map out the costs and restriction posed by local content 
regulations in these areas. This focus was related to the fact that many companies based in 
Norway are experiencing a growing share of their revenue stemming from international 
operations (Blomgren et al 2015). However, it turned out that getting in touch with people 
within the different companies, which were sufficiently qualified to answer questions about 
local procurement and regulatory demands, was harder than I expected. It was apparent that I 
needed to get in touch with a “gatekeeper”, someone who could get me in touch with the 
necessary people. For me this gatekeeper turned out to be Norsk Oljemuseum, who were able 
to share some of their contacts within the Norway-based companies operating abroad. Yet, I 
needed more informants to continue with my original design. 
The answer was to take a step back and adjust my original research design. My primary interest 
was always: how oil-exporting countries can achieve local content development in conjunction 
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with their petroleum activities. Therefore, I adjusted my design to look at how a conceptual 
model of local content development looks when applied to a real world case, and to focus on 
what external factors affect successful development of local content. This new research-design 
focus on how the external environment influence the resource-holding state’s ability to achieve 
local content development in the domestic petroleum industry. This is opposed to the first 
design, which were focused on how the resource-holding state influences the procurement 
decisions of the industry. As with my original research design, I ran into trouble getting in touch 
with informants, but this time around, I was able to use the databases of reputable international 
organisations to fill in the information gap. In addition to making use of these databases, I 
expanded my interviews from brief focused interviews, to more detailed in-depth interviews. 
Such an increase in the scope of the interviews were suggested by the literature as a way of 
overcoming the problem of having few qualified informants (Tjora 2012: 105). 
To some extent, I believe that by using impartial statistics and analysis I was able to make a 
more credible assessment of Angolan capabilities, then what might have been provided by 
Angolan officials. The lack of government informants creates a potential danger that my 
analysis lean too heavily toward the perception of the industry, and not taking adequate 
consideration of the government’s social responsibility. I attempt to remedy this, by giving 
weight to neutral sources when assessing the impact a drop in investment will have on domestic 
development.  
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Chapter 4. Case study: Angola 
This chapter will begin by introducing Angola as a case through its involvement in the Norad 
managed Oil for Development programme, which provides the context for why Angola might 
be an interesting case study in Norwegian eyes. After the case introduction, I present the 
country’s data for each of the four variables in Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model. Here I 
first focus on the impact that the 2014-drop in oil-prices has had on Angola’s macroeconomic 
environment, in light of how it was affected by the previous drop in oil-prices that occurred 
between 2008 and 2009. Afterwards, I present the country data for each of the three remaining 
variables: local infrastructure, local capabilities, and local policies. These data are based on the 
interviews conducted in the research for this thesis, and the databases presented previously, in 
chapter 3. The final analysis of how these four variables are affected by a drop in oil prices, and 
the repercussions this has for local content development, is further presented in chapter 5. 
4.1 Angola and the Oil for Development programme 
The success of Norway’s management of its petroleum resources, in both escaping the 
“resource curse” and in promoting industrial development, has made its management model an 
export item in its own right. This management model is often referred to as the “Norwegian 
model”, and it is defined by its high degree of government control. It includes: (i) government 
ownership over its resources, (ii) investment of its petroleum revenue in a sovereign wealth 
fund, and (iii) making use of production agreements to promote domestic development (Disch 
et al. 2012: 8).  
The Norwegian government has established a development programme; Oil for development 
(OfD), which centres on exporting the lessons learned from the Norwegian experience. The 
OfD programme is an aid-program that seeks to assist social- and economic development in 
developing oil-exporting countries. This it does through helping its recipients with the 
establishment of good practices for public management of their petroleum resources. The 
program is run by the Norwegian Agency of Development Cooperation (Norad), and it assists 
in petroleum resource management through institutional cooperation with the recipient country. 
The focus area of the programme is to assist its beneficiaries in adopting effective and 
sustainable policies in issues related to petroleum management. These issues include the 
management of health and safety, environmental concerns, and state revenue (Norad 2014b). 
However, the goal of OfD is not to implement the management practices from Norway, but to 
32 
 
contribute with experience, and assist in implementing practices on the beneficiaries own 
initiative (Norad 2014a 6 & 7).  
The OfD programme was officially established in 2005, but petroleum related cooperation 
between Norway and developing petroleum economies has existed in some form since the 
1980’s. The OfD programme is an extension of this cooperation, and as of 2013, the programme 
was assisting 18 different countries (Norad 2014a: 14). The programme categorizes its 
beneficiary countries as either “core” or “non-core” countries. With the core countries receiving 
a considerably larger share of the 1.5 billion NOK spent by the programme as of 2012. The 
majority of these core countries are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the programme also 
include petroleum-producing countries from South-America and Asia (Disch et al 2012: 11). 
Angola is one of these core countries in the OfD programme. The country officially became a 
part of the programme between 2008 to 2012, but Norway has contributed with development 
assistance in Angola since 1987 (Norad 2014a: 18). As the programme officially ended in 2012 
pending a government review, it is now set for a five year extension as budgetary negotiations 
are under way1. In light of this cooperation and the current oil-glut, I look at how Angolan local 
content development is influenced by the fall in the global oil-prices. 
4.2 Local environment 
This section focus on the local environment, more specifically the macroeconomic 
environment, with attention to how it is affected by fluctuations in the oil price. By looking at 
Angola’s macroeconomic management, and how it coped with the 2008 fall in oil prices, we 
get an indication about of the exchange rate and interest rates will react to a fall in oil prices. 
Apart from looking at the exchange rate and interest rate, Kazzazi and Nouri (2012) highlight 
how local development demands sound macroeconomic management. The Norwegian model 
is highlighted as a model of best practices in this regard, in addition to being an example that 
Angola has attempted to model itself after. The main lesson from the Norwegian model in terms 
of macroeconomic management is diversion of oil revenue into a fund, and using this fund as a 
fiscal stabilizer in times of oil price volatility. To illustrate the sustainability of Angola’s 
macroeconomic management, this section look at its ability create an attractive investment 
                                                          
1 As of February 2015. 
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climate, and compare it to the Norwegian model, in terms of its ability to use its petroleum 
revenue to reduce the negative effects of oil price volatility. 
4.2.1 Impact of the 2008-2009 fall in oil prices on the Angolan economy 
In 2008, the price of crude oil rose to an all-time peak of 144.51 dollars per barrel. The peak 
was reached in June, before plummeting steadily the rest of the year, reaching its lowest point 
of 43.59 dollars per barrel by February 2009. This was the largest sustained fall in oil prices 
since the oil glut in 1986, and it posed a new set of challenges for oil exporting countries. Apart 
from minor price fluctuations, the exporting countries had experienced a period of sustained 
growth in oil prices since 2001. With its civil war ending in 2002, this was the first time the 
new Angolan state faced a major price fall in its most important source of revenue. This section 
will look at some of the effects this incident had on the Angolan economy. 
4.1.1.2 Exchange rate 
As a result of fears that the price-fall would lead to runaway inflation, as the central bank had 
recently doubled the amount of kwanza in circulation, the Angolan central bank started 
spending its foreign currency in defence of the kwanza. This policy was dubbed the “hard 
kwanza policy” (Jensen & Paulo 2011: 27). This hard kwanza policy was a policy the country 
had applied for several years, which had succeeded in establishing trust in the currency. 
However, when the prices fell so dramatically in the last months of 2008, this created a severe 
strain on Angola’s foreign reserves. Already in 2008, it sold 1.9 billion dollars to private banks 
in a bid to maintain a stable exchange rate. Two more interventions followed in 2009, reducing 
the country’s total foreign reserves by 37.5 percent. In addition to this, the reserve requirements 
for banks was increased from 15 percent of deposits to 30 percent. The reason for the increase 
in reserve requirements was a surge in demand for dollars, as depositors lost faith in the kwanza 
(Jensen & Paulo 2011: 27). When the central bank eventually started selling dollars to banks 
again, it led to a 13 percent depreciation of the kwanza. 
The attempt to stabilize the kwanza was largely unsuccessful, resulting in a depreciation from 
75 kwanza per U.S: dollar to 92, despite the central bank’s efforts. The failed hard kwanza 
policy also resulted in a large reduction of Angola’s foreign reserves. Interview data from 
Jensen & Paulo’s (2011) study suggest that Angolan decision-makers were convinced that this 
was a necessary step to reduce inflation. Something that would have made imported goods even 
more expensive for the domestic industry. Keeping in mind its limited local manufacturing 
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capabilities, an increase in import prices would be a heavy blow to Angola’s main source of 
revenue, the petroleum industry. 
Figure 4. Inflation rate movement after the drops in oil prices, 2008 (left) and 2014 (right) 
(IECONOMICS 2015) 
 
Figure explanation: Shaded areas show the rate after the oil-prices began to drop. 
 
 
Figure 5 below, shows how the exchange rate was kept below 80 units per U.S. dollar, due to 
the hard kwanza policy, before shooting up to 91 when the central bank again started selling 
dollars. Then we see a steady increase in the exchange rate until there is a sharp increase again 
from 2014 to 2015. This last peak occurs by adding the official exchange rate as of April 2015, 
which was 109.54 units per U.S. dollar (Bloomberg business 2015). This last peak is dotted red 
as to illustrate the fact that there is yet to be any signs of a similar effort to defend the Kwanza 
from depreciating this time around. 
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Figure 5. Official exchange rate of Kwanza per U.S. dollar (World Bank 2015c) 
 
 
4.1.1.3 Current account balance 
As we have now seen, the hard Kwanza policy led to Angola spending a fair share of its foreign 
capital reserves. This is visible on the country’s current account balance, where it experienced 
a significant drop between 2008 and 2009. The graph in figure 6, shows how the 7.1 billion 
dollar current account surplus at the start of 2008, had turned to a 7.5 billion dollar deficit by 
2009. In addition to a reduction of foreign capital, a drop in the current account balance could 
also be caused by a large inflow of investment, and there was in fact, a 76 percent growth in 
investment between 2008 and 2009 measured in FDI (World Bank 2015h). It is likely then that 
this growth in investment contributed to the current account deficit, but the growth in 
investment was even larger between 2007 and 2008. Meaning that there actually was a 
reduction in the actual rate of growth in FDI inflow, from 153 percent the year before. 
Comparatively, government expenditure only increased by 1.3 percent of GDP between 2007 
and 2009, after a longer period of decline in public spending (World Bank 2015d). This seem 
to suggest that the current account deficit is not sufficiently explained by public economic 
expansion, and that the drop in foreign reserves and inflow of FDI is more likely to have caused 
the current account deficit. 
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Figure 6. Angola's current account balance in current U.S. dollars (World Bank 2015e) 
 
By running a current account deficit in 2008, Angola put added strain on its foreign exchange 
reserves. It is obvious that spending its foreign reserves to defend the exchange rate, in addition 
to running a current account deficit, would not ward off inflation long-term. At some point, it 
would run out of foreign exchange reserves, and inflation would take hold. Angola was saved 
from further inflation by the oil prices making a comeback in 2010, but runaway inflation looks 
like a realistic scenario in a period with low oil prices and a current account deficit.  
This is because inflation is linked to the oil-price through the effect that the oil-price has on the 
exchange rate of the oil-exporting country’s currency. A positive price shock leads to an 
improved trade balance, as the value of exports grow in relation to imports, which in turn causes 
the demand for a country’s currency to grow and its value to rise (appreciation). A negative 
price shock will however cause the trade balance to deteriorate, as imports becomes more 
expensive in relation to exports, which in turn reduce the demand for the country’s currency 
and thus lowering its value (depreciation). Exchange rate depreciation means imported items 
become more expensive, which increase the general price level in the economy (inflation). The 
impact of exchange rate depreciation on overall inflation is thus related to a country’s 
dependence imported goods. Angola as a country is largely dependent on its petroleum sector, 
as oil exports amount to more than 90 percent of the country’s total exports. Due to its limited 
domestic production capabilities, the Angolan petroleum industry require the necessary 
machinery and equipment to be imported from abroad. An exchange rate depreciation will 
increase the cost of these items, and thus the production costs for the industry as a whole. With 
no other significant source of export revenue apart from oil, the positive side effects of exchange 
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rate depreciation, such as increased demand for its now cheaper exports, are the not sufficient 
to reduce this widening current account deficit. 
Inflation would have a negative impact on foreign investment activity, as it (i) erodes the return 
from investment, (ii) increases the cost of imports, and (iii) causes economic agents to invest in 
a safer currency. 
4.2.2 The macroeconomic management 
Over several years, the Angolan government have overestimated the real revenue in the annual 
budget. From 2011 to 2013, the annual budgeted revenue exceeded real revenue, with the 
potential of seriously complicating budget management (Fjelstad, Jensen & Paulo 2014: 2). 
Elevated expectations of revenue can cause overspending of public funds, resulting in budget 
deficits. This is exactly what has happened to Angola at the start of 2015. The annual budget 
for 2015 was calculated using an oil price of 81 dollars per barrel, which, as of March, was 33 
dollars over the real price. This miscalculation coupled with massive public infrastructure 
projects have amounted to an increasing budget deficit, going from 0.3% in 2013 to 2.9% of 
GDP in 2014 (World Bank 2015f). The government is currently financing this deficit through 
borrowing in excess of 2 billion dollars, from the World Bank and various other financial 
institutions (Baily & Hoskins 2015: 20742). By borrowing money, the government increase the 
interest rates on its debt payments, making its debt more expensive. This has resulted in Angola 
having their credit rating downgraded from B+ to a BB- by Standards and Poor (Ibid). The 
dangers investment activity of increasing government debt is related to the effect it has on 
interest rates. Higher interest rates increase the cost of borrowing money for private actors, 
leaving business with less money.  
4.1.2.1 Revised budget for 2015 
The Angolan government has enacted a revised budget for 2015 to counter for the recent 
changes in oil prices. This new budget is calculated on a projected oil price of 40 dollars per 
barrel instead of the initial 81 dollars per barrel, and assumes a drop in state oil revenue of 25 
percent (Baily & Hoskins 2015: 20742). By downgrading the budgetary expectations for the oil 
price, they are responding to the expected decline in revenue by cutting government expenditure 
with 25 percent 2015 (Ibid). These cuts will most likely have a serious influence on domestic 
development. However, the revised budget states that it will continue to protect domestic 
production, and public expenditure on health care and education will not be affected (World 
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Bank 2015f). However, the decrease in public expenditure has caused the growth projections 
to decline in manufacturing, construction and agriculture, which could mean a further decline 
in taxable income (Baily & Hoskins 2015: 20742).  
While the Norwegian government, when faced with the previous oil glut, decided to cut taxation 
of the petroleum sector in order to attract investment, Angola has created a new tax. This tax is 
on foreign exchange operations, and attempts to target the increasing use of currency transfers 
abroad from international companies (Ibid.). This new tax will most likely have the largest 
impact in the petroleum sector, as the MNCs operating there will face a new penalty for the 
revenue they choose not to reinvest domestically.  
4.1.2.2 The petroleum fund 
As previously mentioned, the macroeconomic management of Angola’s petroleum revenue is 
based off the Norwegian model. The Norwegian management model was adjusted after the 
price fall in 1986. Based on the lessons of the 86’ oil glut, a system where the state’s oil revenue 
was put into the national petroleum fund called the Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global (NGPFG) was implemented in 1990 (Ministry of finance 2015). The goal was to reduce 
the negative effects of oil price volatility in the domestic economy, by using the petroleum find 
as a fiscal stabilizer. The Angolan sovereign wealth fund, Fundo Soberano De Angola 
(FSDEA), was established in 2012 with an initial capital of 5 billion dollars. Further funding is 
paid through a revenue-sharing agreement, at a rate of 100.000 barrels a day (IMF 2014a: 19). 
This means that the fund’s capital inputs are dependent on the oil-price. The current investment 
portfolio consists largely of investments in sub-Saharan infrastructure, hospitals, timber works 
and agriculture (FSDEA 2014). These are typical long-term social investments with a high 
return for human and regional development, but with low short-term capital return. 
Additionally, in contrast to the NGPFG, the FSDEA does not have a mandate to act as a fiscal 
buffer in times of oil price volatility (Ibid). Overall, the FSDEA is a relatively new wealth fund 
that does not possess either the capital or mandate to act as a fiscal stabilizer in times of 
government budget deficits.  
4.1.2.3 Taxes 
Like the Norwegian government following the oil glut in the late 1980’s, the Angolan 
government is now in a position where they need to create incentives for the oil companies to 
invest in the Angolan market. Oil sales amounted to 97 percent of the country’s export revenue 
as of 2012, illustrating its dependence on the sector (IMF 2014b: 3). The Norwegian policy 
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response in 1987 was to decrease the tax level in the sector, by removing the production tax and 
decreasing the surtax by 5 percent (SSB 1987: 73).  
In comparison, the Angolan tax regime have a production tax of 20 percent, which in marginal 
fields and ultra-deep waters2 is adjusted down to 10 percent. In the case of production sharing 
agreements (PSAs) between Sonangol and international producers, no production tax is 
imposed on the participants (Ernst & Young 2013: 10 & 11). PSAs account for the majority of 
the petroleum agreements for the offshore blocks outside Cabinda, and it is the favoured 
agreement type in these high cost areas. The petroleum income tax of 50 percent also applies 
to PSAs, and is even larger (65.75 percent) for Risk Service Agreements (RSAs). In addition 
to the petroleum income tax, there is a surface charge at 300 dollars per square kilometre, and 
a petroleum transaction tax at 70 percent. Like the production tax, this petroleum transaction 
tax is not applicable to PSAs, which means that Angolan PSAs only impose the 50 percent 
petroleum income tax and the marginal surface charge (Ibid: 8-15). Comparably, the Norwegian 
taxation of petroleum production imposes a combined tax of 78 percent on field operators 
(Skatteetaten 2013: 37). Overall, the tax rate on petroleum activities in the Angolan sector is 
fairly low, and as the tax-rates are negotiated when entering a PSA, there is room for the 
government to give further tax incentives when faced with a glut. 
4.3 Local infrastructure 
Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model make use of transport-, power-, and communication 
variables to assess the level of a country’s infrastructure development. By using data from the 
World Bank, World Economic Forum, and interview data from international companies, this 
section tries give an accurate account of Angola’s infrastructure. Both in terms of development 
level, and its competitiveness in an international context. In addition to this, this section 
highlights the main challenges facing the Angolan infrastructure, in relation to the oil-price and 
the changing investment climate.  
4.3.1 Current state of the Angolan infrastructure 
The current level of development of Angola’s infrastructure is a reminder of its third world 
economy, recovering from almost three decades of civil war. There are severe deficiencies in 
the state of Angolan infrastructure that contribute to the country being ranked 181 out of a total 
of 189 countries in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking for 2015 (World Bank 
                                                          
2 below 750 meters. 
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2014: 4). This ranking focuses heavily on the surveyed countries development in infrastructure 
and logistics. Making it a good indicator of a country’s overall infrastructure development. By 
looking at the development of the different aspects of Angola’s infrastructure, it is apparent that 
there are significant inefficiencies affecting business activity that can be attributed to 
insufficient infrastructure development. Summarized, these inefficiencies were estimated to 
amount to an annual loss of about 5 percent of GDP in total, as of 2011 (Pushak & Foster 2011: 
2). Most significant are the inefficiencies in power supply and road infrastructure, which have 
a large impact on business development, as they limit production and industrial linkages 
throughout the country’s different regions. 
Figure 7. Infrastructure quality indicators compared against world median (WEF 2014) 
 
Note: overall ranking in parentheses   
Figure 7, shows how Angola’s infrastructure development scores against the world median, and 
how it ranks compared to the other 144 countries in the WEF-sample. As we can see from this 
graph, the quality of Angola’s electricity supply, education sector, and roads, pose the largest 
challenges to its overall infrastructure development. The country’s score on quality of air 
transport and port infrastructure is somewhat more encouraging with scores outside the bottom 
ten percent of the sample. Despite relatively positive scores on these two variables, they are not 
able to keep the overall assessment of the country’s infrastructure from ranking in the bottom 
five percent of the survey. 
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4.3.2 Improvements  
In the last thirteen years, the Angolan government has significantly increased public spending 
on infrastructure improvement. Annual expenditure was close to 14 percent of total GDP as of 
2010, as it pursues rapid reconstruction. This is twice the estimated short-term requirements, 
which might reflect an economic optimism that followed a period with high oil-prices (Pushak 
& Foster 2011: 2 & 3). 
Figure 8. Infrastructure status provided by the World Bank, compiled from (Pushak & Foster 
2011) 
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4.3.3 Future infrastructure expenditure 
Plans to increase public spending on infrastructure and education is currently in the works 
(Muzima & Mendy 2015: 6). With massive infrastructure projects like Port Dande and the 
building of schools for its large young population, there is certainly going to be added pressure 
on an already strained national budget. Officials are trying to finance these new expenses by 
the money saved from reducing- and eventually removing fuel-subsidies. Estimates suggest that 
the expected cut in public expenditure from subsidy removal between 2014 to 2015 will amount 
to about 1.4 percent of total GDP (IMF 2015b: 6). The official plan calls for a slight reduction 
in subsidies each year until 2020, when it is supposed to be completely removed, freeing up 3.7 
percent of the country’s total GDP, as of 2015. While this new financing plan is put into effect, 
future infrastructure projects have been put on hold until new capital has been made available. 
The long-term plan of freeing up capital by removing fuel-subsidies is being supplemented by 
new state loans. Angola is seeking 15.2 billion dollars in loans from international creditors, and 
the selling of government debt through its new Eurobond (England 2015b).  
While the central bank met the previous oil-price fall, in 2008/2009, by spending a large portion 
of its foreign reserves in defence of the local currency’s exchange rate, the current policy is to 
maintain its foreign reserves. This new policy creates problems for domestic companies that 
need foreign currency for imports (England 2015a). By freezing infrastructure projects, cutting 
fuel-subsidies, and cutting access to foreign currency, the Angolan government is increasing 
the costs for its domestic industry. The extent of the effect that this new development will have 
on local industry seems to be dependent on two variables. These are: (i) how long it takes for 
the Angolan government to free up enough capital to resume its massive new infrastructure 
projects, and (ii) how successful the local industry is at attracting private investment.  
4.3.4 Interview data: Infrastructure 
To see how the international companies operating in Angola are affected by the poor 
infrastructure development, the two supply-companies Subsea7 and NCA/Oceaneering were 
asked how the local infrastructure affect their operations. In my interview with sales and 
marketing director for the African market in Subsea7, Geert Wiechers, he stressed the fact that 
infrastructure is essential for their contribution to local development.  
“Subsea7 have a goal of our presence attributing to sustainable local development in 
the areas we operate. For instance, we created an additional fabrication yard in Ghana, 
and we would like to attribute to the education in these areas. Of course, what we are 
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able to do in terms of local development depends in large part on the local infrastructure 
and the domestic capabilities.” (Wiechers 03.04.2015). 
The company’s need for local infrastructure in order to supply the Angolan market, is also the 
main rationale behind Subsea7 establishing themselves in the country. 
“Our strategic concerns are that we need a local presence to be able to supply the 
infrastructure necessary to secure our long-term presence in the region. For this, we 
need local- labour and subcontractors, and in turn develop their skill-level and 
capabilities. This is a win-win for the local industry, and us, but it requires the support 
from the local government. The goal is always to develop a competitive industry, so the 
goal of local content measures and government policy should be aimed at creating this”. 
(Wiechers 03.04.2015). 
This suggest that the local infrastructure, could act as a limit on the industry’s ability to 
contribute to local development if not properly developed.  
In the interview with the department manager for NCA/Oceaneering’s plug and abandonment 
operations, Olav Fatland, he noted that the Angolan infrastructure does pose limits on local 
procurement. NCA/Oceaneering are stationed on platforms in the Cabinda territory, on the 
north-west coast of the country, where the infrastructure is considerably less developed than 
further south. 
“Because of the remoteness and the lacking infrastructure in the area we operate, our 
service providers are almost entirely American and European companies. The lack of 
an Angolan alternative makes any potential requirement of service procurement from 
Angolan companies, unrealistic.” (Flatland 03.02.2015). 
 
Here we can see how the current state of the Angolan infrastructure, along with its limited local 
capabilities, is perceived by the industry as having a major impact on their ability to invest in 
local industry.   
 
4.4 Local capabilities 
In this section, we look at the factors that the conceptual model suggest are important for the 
development of domestic capabilities in the petroleum industry. The conceptual model 
especially highlights (i) the general education level, (ii) infrastructure development, and (iii) 
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development of cooperation between domestic and established international companies, as 
three important variables in the makeup of local capabilities. By looking at each of these factors, 
we are able to see how the local capabilities, as a whole, is influenced by fluctuations in 
investment activity. In the previous section, Figure 8 show some of the challenges and 
improvements to Angola’s infrastructure development, so this section will focus on domestic-
foreign industrial linkages, and the country’s education level. The conceptual model provides 
us with two assumptions in regard to these two factors: (i) that improving the general education 
level would have a positive effect on local capacity development, and (ii) that establishing 
cooperation between domestic and international companies has a positive effect on the 
development of local capabilities.  
4.4.1 Education 
Lessons from Malaysia and Brazil show how the general education level affect a petroleum 
producing country’s capacity for domestic participation (Tordo et al. 2013: 138 & 139). With 
67.1 percent of the Angolan population between the ages of 1 to 24, and with close to 50 percent 
below the age of 15 (UN DSA 2012). It is obvious from these numbers, that the demographic 
make-up of the population poses a natural limitation on the general education level. With such 
a young population, those who are capable of having attained a higher degree is limited to the 
30.5 percent share of the population who are between 24 and 64. Looking at Figure 9, the total 
number of Angolans enrolling in higher education has increased dramatically since 2002. From 
12566 in 2002 to 142798 in 2011, with numbers expected to have grown to 195000 in 2015 
(Angola-Today 2015). However, this dramatic increase in enrolment in higher education hides 
the fact that the peak in 2011 is just 2.4 percent of the eligible population.  
Figure 9. Number of Angolans enrolled in tertiary education 1988-2011 (UNESCO UIS) 
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By comparison, the OECD average in higher education attainment for the same age group is 32 
percent, and for the BRICS-countries,3 the average is 18.5 percent (OECD 2013: 37). The trend 
of increased enrolment in higher education needs to be considered against the fact that the 
percentage of Angola’s total GDP spent on education has decreased against the growth of the 
population. While the population numbers have doubled between 1986 and 2010, the 
percentage of GDP spent on education has declined by 2.81 percent from 6.36 to 3.47 in the 
same time-period (UNESCO 2014).  
4.4.1.1 Education reform, and remnants of the civil war 
Much of the current lack in educational development can be attributed to the civil war that 
ended in 2002. The damage done to both transport- and school infrastructure requires both time 
and resources to rebuild. Additionally, the mentioned demographic challenges linked to having 
such a young population is something that poses a massive challenge to the Angolan education 
system. These challenges are related to the expected public expenditures needed on schools and 
teachers to educate this large new generation of Angolans. In a local content perspective, the 
education standard has to be at a level sufficient to secure local participation in the domestic 
petroleum industry, which require a longer education time than the current average of 4.4 years 
in total (Angola-Today 2015). Thousands of schools are currently being built or rebuilt, and 
new teachers are being trained to cope with this influx of new students.  
The revised budget for 2015 has protected education from the recent cuts in public expenditure, 
addressing this need for educational expansion. Additionally, the process of funding this 
expansion program has been aided by development assistance from UNESCO, and private 
companies in the petroleum industry. BP, ExxonMobil and Chevron, have all funded education 
programs aimed at various levels of Angolan students. To some degree, these private 
investment efforts can be attributed to the government providing investment incentives, like tax 
exemptions and customs benefits (Angola-Today 2015). 
4.4.2 Local industrial capacity 
The capabilities of the Angolan petroleum industry is closely linked to its infrastructure 
development and investment activity from international corporations. Since the end of the civil 
                                                          
3 Minus India, no data in the OECD survey. 
46 
 
war in 2002, massive public expenditure on infrastructure, especially transport infrastructure, 
has increased domestic capabilities substantially. The expansion and upgrade of the Lobito 
corridor, and Port Luanda with the connected railway, has created regional linkages and 
increased the domestic capacity to handle the logistics connected to its oil-sector (Duarte et al. 
2014). The improvements in Port Luanda have decreased turn-around time for vessels by almost 
two weeks since 2008, according to the port administrators (Bloomberg Business 2014). This 
expansion of public expenditure on infrastructure has increased Angola’s infrastructure ranking 
from 141 to 139, out of the 144 countries surveyed in the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
global competitiveness report, in the time period between 2011 and 2014 (WEF 2014: 13).  
4.4.2.1 Foreign-domestic industry linkages 
Kazzazi and Nouri (2012) highlights the creation of cooperation between foreign and domestic 
companies as a means to transfer technical knowledge and capital to local firms. In addition to 
being a policy-goal that will benefit local development. This is precisely what the Angolan 
government has sought to achieve through decree 127/2003. The second supply category in the 
government decree makes it necessary for foreign companies operating in technically 
demanding segments in the petroleum industry to operate with a domestic partner company. 
This has resulted in significant local development projects like the Paenal fabrication yard, and 
the Sonamet fabrication yard, with the latter being the largest fabrication yard in Africa. The 
Paenal yard was developed in a joint venture between SBM Offshore and Sonangol, while 
Sonamet is a joint venture between Subsea7 and Sonamet, a subsidiary of Sonangol. These 
fabrication yards are two massive industrial sites that together employ thousands of Angolan 
nationals, and provide domestic capabilities in both the FPSO and subsea fields. These fields 
are technology-heavy segments of the petroleum industry, and areas where Angolan industry 
would certainly struggle to compete without cooperation from established international 
companies.  
4.4.2.2 Domestic supplier database 
To assist the domestic industry in creating productive linkages with the international 
companies, the Angolan government, in cooperation with four of the largest operator 
companies, established a company registry in 2005. The registry was designed to help small- 
and medium sized local suppliers capture contracts. This registry called Centro de Apoio 
Empresarial (CAE), aims to streamline the IOCs process of finding local suppliers by 
categorization, training, and certification of those companies who register with the CAE. This 
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program has contributed to local companies receiving 309 contracts, amounting to 4236 jobs in 
its first five years of its existence (Ovadia 2012: 407).  
Figure 10. Foreign-domestic partnership effect on domestic technological capability (WEF 
2014) 
 
This is a promising development for the domestic industry, which is also apparent in the above 
average technology input received from FDI, as seen in figure 10. However, the graph also 
shows that the domestic ability to absorb this new technology is not great, with Angola ranking 
second to last in the WEF-survey in this regard. This lack of ability to absorb new technology 
could be seen in connection with the general education level, where poor local standards put a 
restraint on higher-level participation. The last variable for value chain presence looks at the 
breadth of presence of domestic companies in the value chain. The aim of including this variable 
is to illustrate the local capability to participate across the different segments of the industry. 
Angola scores in the bottom half of the sample-countries in this regard, ranking 140 out of 144 
countries overall in the WEF competitiveness-survey (WEF 2014: 109). This data tells us that 
foreign-domestic industry partnerships have not substantially increased the domestic capacity 
outside the service segments. 
4.4.2.3 Local industry competitiveness 
Outside the service segments of the petroleum industry, where the use of Angolan suppliers are 
mandatory, the success of domestic companies in obtaining contracts is limited by their lack of 
competitiveness compared to foreign suppliers. To illustrate the overall competiveness of the 
local industry, Figure 10 make use of the country’s score on the basic competitiveness 
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indicators for local business from the WEF competitiveness report (2014). The scores on 
infrastructure and macroeconomic environment are added, as shown in the conceptual model, 
to complete the picture. 
Figure 11. Competitiveness indicators for local capabilities in Angola against world median (WEF 
2014) 
 
Note: Overall ranking in parentheses. 
4.4.3 Interview data local capabilities 
To see how the international companies operating in Angola assess the local capabilities, this 
section gives the accounts of Subsea7 and Oceaneering/NCA’s experience with the subject. 
4.4.3.1 Subsea7 
Subsea7 have developed the largest fabrication yard in Africa in cooperation with Sonamet, as 
part of a joint venture. This yard together with its fabrication vessel the Simar Esperanca, gives 
their Angolan division the capability of supplying even the most highly advanced services 
Subsea7 can offer. In addition to this, the fabrication yard provides employment for many 
Angolans. When asked about what they define as local content in their operations in Angola, 
the reply was:   
“In Angola we at Subsea7 make use of man-hours/fabrication done in country. This is due 
to the limitations imposed on us by the local capabilities. There is not a lot of qualified 
industry in regards to engineering and subcontractors for us, due to the limited industrial 
and educational development of the region”. (Wiechers 03.04.2015). 
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It is clear from the interview data and the review of Angola’s education standards, that the poor 
standards of Angola’s educational system, has a negative effect on the local capacity to 
participate in the domestic petroleum industry. Especially in the more demanding high-tech 
segments. Mr. Weichers stresses that there are locals working in managerial and executive 
positions in the company, but again, the low number of qualified Angolans limit their numbers.  
When asked if there is one, or more, local content measures that he thought were especially 
effective in improving Angolan capabilities, he responded:    
“I would like to highlight our joint venture with Sonamet, which have brought a lot of local 
benefits, such as local employment, increased demand and revenue into the local 
community. It has also created a high-tech environment in Africa, which can help with the 
development of the local industry. I would also think that developing the education system 
would help Angolans in securing higher positions and a larger percentage of engineering 
positions in the domestic petroleum industry”. (Wiechers 03.04.2015). 
4.4.3.2 NCA/Oceaneering 
NCA/ Oceaneering operates on platforms in the Cabinda territory, and has a different measure 
of local content than Subsea7. They operate with the percentage of working hours that is 
performed by nationals and services provided by Angolan suppliers, instead of production in 
country. To ensure that they make use of local labour to the largest extent possible, they have 
an obligation of hiring one local per visa given to an expatriate. The company’s problem with 
finding qualified Angolan suppliers are covered in the infrastructure chapter, so this section 
will look at their experience with local employment. When asking their department manager 
about his experience with employing Angolans, he responded:  
“In terms of employing Angolan nationals, we hire people both in executive- and non-
management positions in the company. There is a surge of Angolan’s graduating from 
universities in South Africa, who qualify for technical and management positions. We 
experience these more educated Angolans to be ambitious and with the right attitude to be an 
asset to the company. It seems like Angolans generally are aware that they are there to satisfy 
the local content requirements. In our experience, this has adversely affected the attitude of 
Angolans in our employment to the point where it has been a challenge to the working 
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environment. This is a problem we do not see with the more professional Angolans who are 
emerging from the universities in South Africa”4. (Fatland 03.02.2015). 
Their emphasis is on education standards, but this time in a positive light, highlighting the effect 
that improving education standards are having on local participation. He also provide some 
insight into the indirect costs of having high minimum requirements of local employment, 
combined with a low-level of education and training. However, it seems that the overall 
education level does have an effect on local participation. When asked to highlight one or more 
initiatives for improving local content that he found to be effective, the reply again focused on 
increasing the education level: 
“I would like to highlight our recruitment conferences in South-Africa. We have been 
able to recruit several Angolan nationals for managerial positions from this initiative.”5 
(Fatland 03.02.2015) 
4.5 Local policies 
The conceptual model includes all public policies affecting local content development in this 
variable. However, for the sake of structure, this section will focus on the regulatory policies, 
while macroeconomic policies are presented in the local environment section. The Angolan 
regulatory policies for local content development are comprehensive. This is especially true for 
the petroleum sector, where a host of laws and regulations aim to create opportunities for local 
participation. The commitment to creating a framework that is conducive for both local 
employment and participation in the domestic petroleum industry is visible throughout the 
Angolan petroleum management. This is also evident through their revised annual budget for 
2015, where expenditure on local development were one of the few areas of public spending 
that was unaffected by the severe budget cuts (Baily & Hoskins 2015: 20742).  
4.5.1 Regulatory regime on local content in petroleum activities 
A policy of nationalisation of the petroleum industry was introduced in 1982 through decree 
20/1982. The decree secured requirements for the mandatory employment and training of 
Angolan nationals, by companies operating in the Angolan petroleum sector. This decree has 
since been replaced twice with new government decrees, which have made the requirements 
somewhat less clear-cut. The current decree, 17/2009, stipulates that IOC’s should aim to fill 
                                                          
4 Author’s translation. 
5 Author’s translation. 
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all their positions with Angolans. To reach this ambitious goal, the ministry of petroleum must 
approve all employment of expatriates in the industry. Resulting in the oil-companies having 
to document that there is no equally qualified Angolan national that could fill the same position. 
Local preference for Angolan equipment and services is covered by decree 127/2003, where 
article 27 establishes a preference margin of ten percent in favour of Angolan companies. This 
preference margin is however just for services and products that hold the same quality as the 
non-Angolan option. Angola being a developing country in industrial terms, the requirements 
on quality mean that the domestic industry only have a limited amount of products and services 
that are offered at a competitive level. Angola is a member of the WTO and would normally be 
restricted from enacting protectionist policies, but it is able to implement this preference margin 
through the special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions for least developed countries 
(LDCs). These provisions allow WTO-members classified as LDCs to implement protectionist 
industrial policies, as long as their economies remain under-developed. Through the 
establishment of Decree 127/2003, the Angolan government has created three categories of the 
different services required by the oil companies, where certain services are restricted to Angolan 
companies. The criteria for category-one contracts, which are the services that are exclusive to 
Angolan companies, are: 
“All activities which do not require a high capital value, and basic/average and in-depth 
non-specialised know-how, in which the participation of foreign companies has to take 
place only on the initiative of Angolan companies come under this system”. (Oil 
Ministry decree 127/03 2003). 
The second category of services, are those who are exclusive to joint ventures between a foreign 
and an Angolan company. Services that are in this second category of local preference are based 
on the criteria; 
“All areas which require a reasonable level of capital in the oil industry and in-depth not 
always specialist know-how where the participation of foreign companies has to be 
permitted only in association with national companies or on initiative come under this 
system” (Oil Ministry decree 127/03 2003). 
The third and last category of services are open to competition between foreign and domestic 
companies. These services are capital heavy, and typically require a large amount of expertise 
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and experience, which means that domestic companies are unable to supply the same product 
as foreign companies. The criteria for the services in this category are:   
“Not excluding the possibility of partnerships between Angolan companies and foreign 
companies the competition system means all oil activities (offshore and onshore) not 
described in the systems above and which require a high level of capital in the oil industry 
and in-depth specialist know-how” (Oil Ministry decree 127/03 2003).  
By dividing the different contracts into separate categories, the Angolan government were able 
to secure that large amounts of supply contracts from the oil companies are only available to 
domestic companies. This policy effectively forces the oil companies to invest in the 
development of the Angolan petroleum industry, but still making it evident that there are certain 
areas where the domestic industry is still unable to compete. 
4.5.1.1 Tax- and tariff deductions 
The oil taxation law 13/2004 makes the oil companies expenses on certain training and social 
programmes deductible from its tax obligations. This policy of tax deductions for local content 
development is continued through decree 14/2010, which makes the companies expenses in 
training and development of Angolan human resources tax deductible (Decree 127/03). In 
addition to these tax regulations, Angola also employs tariff regulations for the development of 
its domestic petroleum industry. Article four of the oil customs law 11/2004 makes imports of 
equipment used for the training of personnel exempt from import duties (Law 11/04, article 
4.16).  Angola also has tariff exemption on other imports of specialized equipment related to 
the extraction of oil. However, article six of the same law makes sure that these exemptions are 
only valid for equipment that cannot be supplied by an Angolan company, at a price not higher 
than ten percent of the foreign import (Law 11/04, article 6).  
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Figure 12. Laws and decrees that make the Angolan local content policy, compiled from (Calixto 
& Paiva 2013: 10 & 11) 
 
4.5.2 Petroleum agreements 
Angola has different kinds of agreements for its varying concession blocks, which makes the 
level of government participation vary depending on where the resources are located. The 
onshore blocks are operated by joint ventures between Sonangol and IOCs, where the resources 
are ceded to the oil companies in return for royalties and taxes (Ramos 2012: 6). In these joint 
ventures, the government takes a part in both the costs and risks of exploration, which can be a 
large financial risk for a developing economy. This is why the Angolan government prefers to 
enter PSAs with the IOCs, as the oil companies then take all the initial risk and expenses 
attached to exploration. The Angolan oil minister Jose Botelho Vasconcelos explicitly stated 
this preference for PSAs:   
“We are a Third World economy, and have difficulty obtaining capital, we therefore 
prefer production-sharing agreements because government investment is only required 
once a discovery has been declared economically viable.” Oil minister Jose Botelho 
Vasconcelo (Gentile 2007).  
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For a country with limited capital and industry to invest in exploration of its petroleum 
resources, the option to enter PSAs instead of Joint ventures is less profitable, but considerably 
less risky. The major producing oil fields are almost all under PSA agreements between 
Sonangol, and one, or a joint venture of IOCs, making PSAs the most common form of 
concession agreement in the Angolan petroleum sector. The Angolan PSAs are under a separate 
legal regime than the activities onshore, and often have different provisions in terms of local 
content. However, this does not mean that the terms of the PSAs are any more lax than in the 
initial regulatory regime. Sonangol has often used its powerful position in the PSAs to push for 
even more encompassing local content requirements (Ovadia 2012: 402).  
As the sole concessionaire, Sonangol has close to complete control of procurement by its PSA 
partners, as they have to approve the awarding of any service contract that exceeds US$100.000. 
In addition to control over its production partners procurement, Sonangol possess the power to 
give preference to any company it chooses. This preference is not only limited to Angolan 
companies, but can also be given to foreign companies if they make use of a certain level of 
local content. While these preferred companies can even obtain the ten percent preference 
margin usually reserved for Angolan companies, others have been forced to accept bids with 
up to thirty percent price-preference (Ovadia 2012: 402 & 403). The background for why the 
PSAs might have more severe local content regulations is connected to the IOC’s own practices, 
and Sonangol’s mandate. As the sole government negotiator of the terms of the PSAs, Sonangol 
is in a position to put pressure on the IOCs to accept further local content concessions. Since 
the oil companies operating in Angola are known to follow up on the terms of their PSA more 
thoroughly than Angolan law, Sonangol strategically uses the PSA to secure that they enforce 
their local content regulations. 
A third category of production agreement has recently been implemented, namely risk-sharing 
agreements (RSA) between Sonangol and IOC’s (Ramos 2012: 6). This new arrangement is in 
use for Angola’s previously largely unexplored pre-salt and deep-sea blocks. As the name of 
the agreement suggest, this arrangement involve a greater financial risk for the IOCs than a 
PSA, but also predictable revenue. It could be assumed that the use of RSAs for these allocation 
blocks is a measure to increase the incentives for IOC’s to develop a previously underdeveloped 
part of Angola’s petroleum resources. In terms of local content, the reduced participation of a 
Sonangol in the actual operation of the oil- and gas fields covered by RSAs might be 
unfortunate. In joint ventures and PSA’s they are able to learn directly from working with the 
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IOCs, while in the RSA the IOC is a contractor on behalf of government, which often mean 
that they operate the field by themselves or in joint ventures with other IOCs.  
The concern for local content being included in these RSAs shaped the content of the contracts 
for block 9 and 21, which were entered between Sonangol and their contractors. These contracts 
contain the same local content regulations as we see in Angolan PSA’s and joint ventures, with 
a ten percent local preference margin, domestic supplier provisions and tariffs deductions for 
the training of Angolan personnel (Open Oil 2015a&b).  
4.5.3 Interview data 
Sales and marketing director for Subsea7’s activities in Africa, Geert Wiechers, identifies a 
decline in the push for local content following the most recent oil glut. He sees this change in 
policy as one of the most significant repercussions for his company in Angola, resulting from 
the decline in oil-prices.  
“The push for local content has been substantially lessened in the last year. I believe this 
to be an industry wide trend, not just affecting the subsea sector, but also the other segments 
in the petroleum industry, including the operators. This means less work for local business. 
This is due to the declining oil-price, which makes contracting companies less interested in 
local tenders and more concerned with cost reduction. This is also true for Subsea7.” 
(Wiechers 03.04.2015). 
The shift towards easing up on the local content requirements could indicate a change in the 
bargaining position between the oil companies and the Angolan state. Future implications of a 
relaxation of local content demands in PSAs could be a reduction in overall foreign investment 
and less work for local suppliers.  
Not all international companies experience a decline in push for local content. Olav Fatland of 
Oceaneering/NCA, contend that they see heavier local content regulations affecting their 
company after the price fall.  
“The regulations in Angola are really demanding. It is required of us to provide a 
certain amount of local content in the initial contract. However, since December 2014 
it has become stricter, with an absolute requirement to employ one Angolan worker per 
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visa given to an expatriate. The idea is that the expat will train that one Angolan to 
eventually take over his job.”6 (Fatland 03.02.2015). 
 
This suggest that the declining push for local content is dependent on either the specific 
company, the nature of their operations, or the specific production agreement they are attached 
to. As both these companies are linked to subsea solutions, the significant difference between 
them is that Subsea7 has in-country manufacturing and an Angolan partner company. 
Regardless of the reason behind their different experiences, the account from Subsea7 suggests 
that Angola is responding to the changing investment climate. This they are doing by relaxing 
their local content requirements, at least for MNCs with local manufacturing and a domestic 
partner. 
 
Both companies agree that local content regulations increase the cost of international 
operations, with NCA/Oceaneering giving it as one of the main reasons for why they merged 
with Oceaneering. 
 
“When we started out in Angola as NCA we did not have the resources to follow through 
on the substantial local content requirements imposed on us. This resulted in our contract 
only being renewed by 3 months at a time. This is one of the reason for the merger with 
Oceaneering, who provides the financial muscle for us to be able to deliver on the 
requirements imposed on us. This has resulted in us being awarded long-term contracts.” 
“It can be very difficult for a medium-sized to small-sized company to deliver on the local 
content requirements imposed by the Angolan government. It is a considerable barrier to 
market entry for smaller companies. It is easier for medium- and small supply companies 
to expand internationally backed by a multinational, especially where there is considerable 
local content requirements.”7 (Fatland 03.02.2015). 
 
                                                          
6 Author’s translation. 
7 Author’s translation. 
57 
 
Chapter 5. Analysis 
This paper makes use of Angola as its case study, and focuses on the country’s response to the 
current drop in oil-prices, in light of the last price fall in 2008. In this section, we are looking 
at what sort of impact the oil price has on the four variables in Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual 
model. The aim of this analysis is to see whether fluctuations in the oil price influence these 
variables, in a way that has a significant impact on local content development in oil-exporting 
countries. The belief is that the oil-price influences these variables contribution to local content 
development, through its effect on the domestic investment climate.  
The underlying assumption is; that if the price of oil influences local content development 
through these four variables, then the conceptual model needs to be expanded to include an 
overarching oil-price effect variable. However, if both private- and public investment activity 
are found to be relatively unaffected by fluctuations in the oil-price, we would be unable see 
such a link between the oil-price and local content development.  
To illustrate how the different internal variables are influenced by the change in investment 
climate, the effect of external variables on each of the variables will be discussed in light of 
MNC investment theory. By looking to a theory of MNC investment strategy, we are able to 
make certain assumptions about how companies are expected to react to a change in 
profitability.   
5.1 The conceptual model 
Kazzazi and Nouri (2012) aimed to inform governments of oil-producing countries about the 
different factors that influence local content development in their petroleum industry. They did 
this by collecting four endogenous variables that the local content literature suggests are 
important for the development of local content. This paper, however, contends that the effect 
these variables have on local development is dependent on one important exogenous variable: 
the price-effect. To assess the impact of this effect, we will now look at how the four different 
variables; local environment, local infrastructure, local policy and local capabilities, are 
affected by fluctuations in the oil price.  
5.1.1 Local environment 
 When we look at how the Angolan macroeconomic environment was affected by the previous 
fall in oil-prices that started in the second half of 2008, it becomes clear that there were 
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significant repercussions for the country’s economy. Firstly, we see that the local exchange rate 
came under severe pressure as a direct cause of the fall in oil prices. The exchange rate of 
countries that are heavily dependent on exports of a certain commodity often move in 
correlation with the price of that commodity. Some good examples of this are the price of oil 
for oil-exporters, but also the price of gold for gold-exporters, are found to have a positive 
correlation with exchange rates (Han, Xu, Wang 2008: 49). For the local industry, exchange 
rate depreciation means that imports become more expensive, but at the same time, exports 
become cheaper for foreign buyers. Exchange rate depreciation can be positive for exporting 
countries if it leads to an increase in demand for its exports, and the country is able to avoid an 
onset of inflation. 
Fluctuations in the oil-price vary in accordance with the global supply and demand. For 
example, a drop in demand will cause oil prices to drop if the rate of supply does not drop in 
parallel with demand, and a drop in supply will cause prices to rise if there is not a parallel drop 
in demand. Following this logic, exchange rate depreciation induced by a fall in oil-prices will 
not lead to a massive increase in demand for oil from oil-exporters. This is because the initial 
exchange rate depreciation is caused by the fall in demand, either in total or in relation to supply.  
5.1.1.1 Falling oil-prices, 2008-2009 
This notion that a price-induced exchange rate depreciation is not followed by an increase in 
demand for cheap oil is confirmed by looking at Angola between 2008 and 2009. In light of the 
falling oil-prices, the country experienced a drop, equalling 23 percent of GDP, in exports of 
goods and services in this time-period (World Bank 2015g). On the contrary, we see that the 
exchange rate depreciation added to inflationary pressure, as the central bank had allowed for 
an increase in money supply, in the belief that they would be able to defend the exchange rate 
in the event of an exchange rate depreciation. This policy was only partly successful, and ended 
up costing a large portion of Angola’s foreign reserves at the time. This suggests that high oil-
prices cause financial optimism in exporting countries, which due to the high price-volatility of 
oil might have serious repercussions for their economy. The growth in inflation has a negative 
impact on domestic investment, because it increases the cost of imports, decreases the return 
on investment, and weakens the faith in the currency. The depreciation of the Angolan exchange 
rate that we see in figure 5 shows how even in the face of foreign exchange spending in defence 
of the exchange rate, the economy struggled to handle the inflationary pressure caused by the 
fall in oil-price. 
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This negative economic effect is also underlined by the current account deficit that emerged in 
2009. The exchange rate depreciation made imports more expensive and the drop in demand 
for oil reduced the country’s export revenue, causing the current account deficit to widen. This 
example from the price fall in 2008 shows that a reduction in oil prices did have an impact on 
the Angolan investment climate then. So, what about this time around? 
5.1.1.2 Falling oil prices, 2015 
We see that the drop in oil-prices has caused the exchange rate to depreciate, increasing the 
inflationary pressure on the economy by increasing import prices. As the national budget is still 
calculated based on the projected oil-price, the sudden fall in prices in 2014 caused a 25 percent 
deficit in the national budget for 2015. This deficit spurred the Angolan government to borrow 
capital from international creditors to cover this deficit. By financing its public expenditures 
through borrowing, the Angolan state is in a position where it might increase scare off private 
investors. This is because external debt coupled with government debt increases domestic 
interest rates, which in turn raises the price of borrowing for private actors and discourage 
businesses from making new investments (Turner & Spinelli 2013: 13). Still, even as some 
public expenditures are financed by the inflow of borrowed capital, we see that the revised 
budget contains a 25 percent reduction in public spending. This drop in public spending has had 
a negative effect on domestic growth, exemplified by the large infrastructure projects that have 
been frozen as a result. These projects represent a source of jobs and contracting opportunities 
for the domestic industry, which are lost due to the effects that oil-price volatility, have on the 
Angolan economy. 
The Angolan case show how a reduction in oil-prices affect an oil-exporting country’s exchange 
rate, and through it, inflation rates, public spending and interest rates. These variables have an 
effect on the local investment climate, either directly by influencing the profit margins for the 
industry, or indirectly by increasing the cost of investment in the local industry. 
5.1.1.3 Petroleum revenue management 
As petroleum-production is so location specific and demanding in terms of resource input, oil-
exporting countries run the risk of developing Dutch disease. As we have seen, the Norwegian 
model aims to mitigate the negative effects that Dutch disease has on the economy by funnelling 
its petroleum revenue to an offshore petroleum fund. Then the revenues can generate interest 
that trickle slowly into the economy, while also functioning as a fiscal stabilizer in times of 
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price fluctuations. This way the petroleum sector’s influence on the economy, in terms of 
exchange rate fluctuations and revenue predictability, can be controlled to some degree. 
Resulting in a more stable investment climate.  
The Angolan case shows some of the difficulties facing developing oil-exporting countries that 
are trying to adopt the Norwegian petroleum management model. Norway does not have a 
pressing need to use large parts of its oil revenue to finance its annual budget. Instead, it makes 
use of “handlingsregelen”, a budgetary rule that says that the national budget will not spend 
more than four percent of the fund’s capital annually. This means that the deficit between public 
spending and annual revenue is kept inside four percent of the fund’s capital. Angola on the 
other hand, is dependent on oil for 70 percent of the annual state revenue, and close to 50 percent 
of its total GDP (Muzima & Mendy 2015: 3). Additionally, Angola has several areas of its 
economy that are in desperate need of public expenditure, like so many developing African 
economies. This need for short-term investment is apparent in the way the FSDEA is managed. 
Apart from not being given the mandate to act as a fiscal stabilizer, oil revenue has been 
invested mainly in social development projects and regional infrastructure. These investments 
are of course needed, but they do not create the same revenue as the NGPFG, which apply a 
more long-term and profit-oriented investment strategy. The Angolan case shows how a 
developing economy might not have the luxury of applying a slow approach to public spending 
of oil revenue. 
Budgetary discipline is also made harder by not applying a more careful approach. The result 
so far, has been that a drop in oil-prices has resulted in large budget deficits, as public spending 
has been calculated by expected future oil-revenue. Expectations that in light of the regularity 
in which oil-prices fluctuate are not much shy of guesswork. Yet, even as we see that there are 
ways in which oil-exporters might decrease the impact that oil-price volatility has on their 
economy, these effects are never totally removed from the equation. For example, despite its 
more careful approach, Norway also experienced exchange rate depreciations following both 
the price falls in 2008 and in 20014 (XE.com 2015). However, its budget policy kept the effects 
from creeping into other sectors of the economy, and causing the budget deficits we see in 
Angola. 
The Angolan case also illustrate how, by causing budget deficits, the oil-price effect can result 
in the government collecting debt. This happens because budgeted public expenditure can no 
longer be financed by oil exports, which means that funding requires an alternative source of 
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capital. This causes the government to borrow money, which will increase government debt 
that might end up further fuelling inflation. This is because investors might lose faith in 
Angola’s ability to service these loans without increasing the money supply, in a future with 
declining oil revenue. The effect on the economy would however be similar in both cases, as 
both growth in the monetary base or a loss of faith in the Kwanza would result in less demand 
for the currency, creating higher domestic prices on goods and services (Cochrane 2011: 56). 
Apart from adding to inflationary pressure, exchange rate depreciation makes a market less 
attractive to foreign investors, and the increase in national debt might cause a reduction in 
private sector investment through its effect on interest rates. In addition to these effects, national 
debt also decrease the percentage of the annual tax revenue that are spent on public projects, as 
the tax revenue now has to service the interest on these loans. 
It is important to note that borrowing could also have positive ramifications for the domestic 
industry. As oil-prices vary, government loans can keep public spending from stagnating in 
times of falling revenue. If they contribute to fuelling public expenditures on capacity-
enhancing measures, such as infrastructure development, these loans might give a positive 
return for the domestic industry. Keeping up activity-levels in the short-term, and increasing 
local capacity in the long-term. Still, the ideal scenario would be to avoid having to increase 
the country’s debt by creating a fiscal buffer, as we see with the Norwegian petroleum fund. 
5.1.1.4 The influence of oil price on the macroeconomic environment 
The Angolan case illustrates how a drop in oil-prices affects the macroeconomic environment 
for oil-exporters. Primarily, this is due to the effect it has on government revenue, and the 
exchange rate of the local currency. In this section, we have seen how variations in these 
variables will affect the interest rate, inflation levels and public debt, in a way that is detrimental 
to the domestic investment climate. By increasing the cost of imports, decreasing the return on 
investment, and increasing the cost of borrowing, the macroeconomic effects of a low oil-price 
discourages private investment. This paper contend that by inhibiting private investment in the 
local industry, a sharp reduction in oil-prices has a negative impact on local content 
development. How much of an impact this oil-price effect has on the economy, is likely to 
depend on how much of an effect it has on the petroleum industry’s profit margin, and on public 
budgets. Since we have now seen how effective development of local content in the petroleum 
industry requires conditions that are conducive to both private and public investment.  
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Through its budgetary rule, the Norwegian model provides oil-exporting countries with a tool 
for how they might mitigate some of the negative effects of oil-price volatility has on the 
economy. Yet, even with this rule in place, the oil-price effect will still have a negative impact 
on private investment, by affecting profit margins in the petroleum industry.  
5.1.1.5 Policy options 
By negatively affecting the investment climate, a decline in oil-prices inhibits local content 
development. Based on this analysis of how the oil-price influences the country’s 
macroeconomic environment, this paper finds two options for how it can alleviate some of these 
effects.  
Firstly, to minimize the effect of oil-price movements; Angola should aim for the FSDEA to 
adopt the function of fiscal stabilizer. We see that through its petroleum fund, Norway has had 
great success in putting its oil-revenue into low-risk investments abroad, where it can generate 
interests. This way the country’s oil-wealth grows, and by applying the budgetary rule, the fund 
can be used to relieve pressure on the economy in times of oil price fluctuations. For this to 
happen, the FSDEA arguably needs to adopt this stabilizing function. In addition to switching 
its investment strategy from one primarily focused on regional development, towards more 
profit based investments in low-risk countries. 
Secondly, we see how Angola struggles to balance its national budget following a sharp drop 
in oil prices. This is due to the budget using expectations of a future barrel price to calculate its 
annual revenue from oil exports. In 2009, the budget was calculated using an expected barrel 
price that was 37.5 percent higher than what it actually turned out to be. History repeated itself 
in 2015, as the initial budget was calculated using a barrel price 51 percent higher than what it 
was later revised down to. Angola could potentially solve this problem by adopting a more 
conservative price-estimate, and funnel any potential proceeds into the FSDEA. This is given 
that the FSDEA is indeed reformed into the image of the NGPFG. 
5.1.2 Local infrastructure 
Kazzazi and Nouri (2012) found that a country’s infrastructure development is of vital 
importance for local content development, as it influences the competitiveness of the local 
industry. From a company perspective, good infrastructure development means increased 
revenue and a reduction in expenses on communication and transportation. Poor infrastructure 
has the opposite effect, as it complicates logistics, adds extra costs, and creates inefficiencies. 
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The theory of MNC investment strategy tell us that due to the growth in global sourcing, 
infrastructure has become more important than ever for corporate investment decisions. This 
paper acknowledges that the nature of the petroleum industry make the relative importance of 
resource endowment more critical to decisions regarding investment location than 
infrastructure development. Still, it contends that the oil-price effect variable captures this trade-
off, as it is based on the industry’s bottom line.  
5.2.2.1 The current standard of Angolan infrastructure 
The reports from the World Bank and WEF have documented how poorly developed the 
Angolan infrastructure really is. Both institutions rate the country’s infrastructure among the 
worst five percent in their respective surveys. Pushak and Foster’s (2011) sector analysis 
provides the gravest estimate, suggesting that as much as five percent of the country’s total 
GDP is lost every year due to infrastructure inefficiencies. There can be no doubt that this 
affects the industry’s profitability, not only for the domestic companies, but also of foreign 
companies that operate in Angola. From the interviews with NCA/Oceaneering and Subsea7, 
we are provided with first-hand accounts of how the international supply companies in the 
petroleum industry are affected by the current state of Angolan infrastructure. Both companies 
express that the shortcomings in infrastructure and capabilities inhibits them from making use 
of domestic suppliers. These estimates of how much the infrastructure inefficiencies amount to 
in annual losses does not include contracts lost to foreign companies as a result of these 
inefficiencies. Therefore, we can assume that the real amount lost due to poor infrastructure 
development is even higher than Pushak and Foster’s (2011) estimate.  
5.2.2.2 The influence of the local infrastructure on local content development 
The interviews conducted for this paper, suggest that the underdeveloped state of the Angolan 
infrastructure inhibits local companies from competing for supply contracts. Illustrating the 
importance of public investment in infrastructure development for the ability of the local 
industry to secure such contracts. This is where the macroeconomic environment has an 
influence on infrastructure development. As I have already established, a drop in oil-prices will 
affect the macroeconomic environment in a way that discourages private investment and public 
spending. This deteriorated investment climate then affects infrastructure development, as it 
reduces financial input in the sector. The Angolan case provides an example of this effect, as 
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several of its planned infrastructure-projects have currently been frozen following the recent 
oil-price induced budget cuts.8  
What we see here is that the oil-price influences the capacity of local infrastructure to promote 
Angolan content. Because the level of investment in infrastructure development rises or falls 
depending on how the oil-price affects both private- and public actor’s willingness to invest in 
the sector. Low oil-prices create a macroeconomic environment where we would expect a low 
level of investment, while high oil-prices have the opposite impact on investment. The Angolan 
expansion in public infrastructure investment in the period of high oil-prices after 2009, and 
subsequent stop in expenditures when the prices fell in 2014, support this assumption.  
This decline in infrastructure expenditure could of course be due to the completion of the initial 
projects, or a change in priority spending unrelated to oil revenue. However, the Angolan 
economy minister Abrãhao Gourgel, admitted to the Financial Times in April 2015 that the 
slow-down in infrastructure spending is in fact directly related to the impact that declining oil 
revenue has on the country’s economy (England 2015b).  
5.2.2.3 Removing fuel-subsidies 
In 2015, the Angolan government started phasing out the country’s extensive use of fuel-
subsidies, and as previously mentioned, began borrowing capital to fund needed infrastructure 
projects. Apart from adding to the already discussed economic repercussions of falling oil-
prices, these measures create added costs for the domestic industry. By removing these fuel-
subsidies, the industries that depend on fuel for production and transport will have to spend 
more money on fuel. This causes the expenses of the domestic industry to increase, in relation 
to its revenue. One can assume that increased production-costs could affect local employment, 
as companies would try to minimize the added expenses from removal of this subsidy. Adding 
to this, local companies are signalling that the Angola industry are already cutting in 
employment because of the halt in infrastructure investment (England 2015a).  
Bazilian and Onyeji (2012) warn against removing fuel subsidies in developing countries, as 
domestic variables such as poor infrastructure and power supply might already be adding to 
production costs. Therefore, by removing subsidies the government contributes to making the 
domestic industry even less competitive, and the country less attractive as an investment 
location. Supporting this conclusion is Siddig et al (2014), who found production output to 
                                                          
8 As of April 22, 2015. 
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decrease with an increase in the prices of petroleum products. These two studies of oil subsidies 
focus on the lessons from the Nigerian petroleum sector. However, Arze del Granado et al. 
(2012) find in their more general study of 20 countries, that higher fuel prices does lead to 
higher production costs, and overall higher level in domestic prices.  
However, removing these fuel-subsidies will increase the amount of money the government can 
spend on infrastructure development by close to four percent of total GDP (IMF 2015b: 6). The 
IMF has also been speaking out for the general removal of fuel-subsidies, and have been 
advocating it as a way to increase public spending, and to increase long-term productivity. This 
is because public expenditure on fuel-subsidies crowds-out spending on less energy intense 
production (Clements et al. 2013: 16). In addition to increasing efficiency, there is also the 
social equity argument, that fuel subsidies benefit the rich. However, this argument is 
controversial, as increased fuel costs will make the overall price-level in the economy rise. 
Siddig et al. (2014) find that increasing fuel prices has a negative effect on household income. 
So, while the equity argument might be true, in the sense that of the top income group will 
profit relatively more from fuel subsidies than the bottom income group—the effect of higher 
consumer prices will have a larger impact on low-income households, where the margins are 
significantly smaller. Still, the removal of fuel-subsidies in times of low oil-prices are promoted 
by analysts, as fuel subsidies are considered a drain on public resources, and the current low 
overall price-level of oil will decrease the impact of removing subsidies (World Bank 2015a: 
167). 
As we can see, the decision to remove fuel-subsidies is likely to have a mixed effect on local 
investment. The arguments that favour subsidy removal highlight how this policy will increase 
long-term productivity, and remove the strain it puts on public resources. The arguments 
against, are related to the short-term effects, such as increased production costs and reduced 
competitiveness of the local industry. There is however another short-term effect from subsidy 
removal. Which is that increased fuel-prices will cause a growth in inflation. The IMF estimates 
that the increase in domestic prices from removing fuel-subsidies will cause an 11 percent 
growth in Angolan inflation (IMF 2015b: 23). This adds to the already increased inflationary 
pressure that the economy experience from a depreciating exchange rate. The trade-off is then 
between a short-term drop in competitiveness of local production and increased inflationary 
pressure, against long-term efficiency enhancement and freeing up public funds.  
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While this trade-off might increase competitiveness in the long-term, what is certain is that it 
will have an effect on the capabilities of the local infrastructure. The reason for this is that 
transportation is one of the most fuel-intense sectors in the economy, and will be the hardest hit 
by an increase in fuel prices (Ibid: 24). This will have to be factored in with the already limited 
transport capabilities of the Angolan infrastructure, and will certainly further deteriorate the 
domestic investment climate in the short-term.  
5.2.2.4 The oil-prices influence on local infrastructure 
Through my interviews and the various studies about the Angolan infrastructure development, 
we see that the current infrastructure standard is far from competitive. This has caused added 
expenses for the industry and limited foreign companies’ ability to make use of domestic 
suppliers. By restricting public spending aimed at improving the sector, the macroeconomic 
environment influences the ability of the local infrastructure to contribute to local content 
development. The period of high oil-prices between 2009 and 2014 contributed to significant 
improvements, but still the overall level of Angolan infrastructure is in the bottom five percent 
in the world. We see that the most recent price-fall has caused a drop in public spending on 
infrastructure, and that this has a negative effect on the profitability of local industry. The 
Angolan government is however trying to fund the necessary projects by freeing up public funds 
through the removal of fuel-subsidies and attracting private investment. 
The literature on fuel-subsidies, show that there is a trade-off when a government tries to free 
up additional public funds in this way. This is because removing fuel-subsidies will increase 
domestic production-costs, making the local industry less competitive. In addition to this, 
higher fuel-prices increase the general price-level in the economy, adding to domestic inflation. 
On the other hand, by phasing out the subsidies slowly, while the fuel prices are relatively low, 
the negative effect of removing fuel-subsidies are minimized, and public spending in the sector 
can be increased long-term.  
The need for infrastructure investment is not just limited to Angola. Looking at the WEF 
competitiveness survey, one can see that underdeveloped infrastructure is a problem facing 
many developing countries with petroleum resources. Out of the bottom 25 countries on the 
infrastructure rankings included in the survey, 16 are oil-exporters (WEF 2014: 17). The 
challenge of removing fuel subsidies is a problem facing several developing countries with 
petroleum endowments. As many are spending a large percentage of their annual GDP on 
maintaining affordable fuel for their internal market through subsidies (IEA 2014). With fuel-
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subsidies having such a large effect on the competitiveness of the local infrastructure, removing 
these subsidies will have a significant impact on local content development. Oil-exporting 
countries contemplating removing fuel subsidies should then consider the effect it is likely to 
have on local content first.  
In light of how this paper finds changes in oil-prices to affect the Angolan economy, we see 
that there is an issue with timing when removing fuel subsidies. The drop in oil-prices causes 
increased pressure on macroeconomic variables that contribute to creating a less attractive 
investment climate. By removing fuel-subsidies, a country further adds to the already negative 
investment climate. The argument that they are expensive and inefficient is of course valid, but 
removing them when the government’s ability to stabilize the economy is already restrained, 
might only add to worsening the impact a fall in oil-prices has on the macroeconomic 
environment. 
5.1.3 Local capabilities 
According to Kazzazi and Nouri (2012), the capacity of a country’s local capabilities are largely 
influenced by its development in education, infrastructure, and its local industrial capacity. This 
is because these variables affect the domestic ability to supply and participate in petroleum 
activities. 
The general education-level will dictate the scope of domestic participation, as it pose a limit 
on the scope of services domestic companies are able to supply. With a low education-level, 
one would expect the domestic industry to be more competitive in low-tech and labour-
intensive production: while a high education-level would enable the supply of more technology-
heavy production. In addition to the spread of educational attainment, the local industry can 
develop advanced capabilities by establishing foreign-domestic industrial linkages, which 
create possibilities for knowledge- and technology transfers.  
We have already seen how the local infrastructure either encourages or discourages local 
participation, as inefficiency increase the cost of local procurement. This section attempts to 
identify how variations in the macroeconomic environment influence the development of local 
capabilities, and its contribution to local content development. This is done by looking at how 
these above-mentioned variables are influenced by the change in the macroeconomic 
environment.  
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5.2.3.1 Education 
We see that the general education level in Angola is not well developed, even by the standards 
of most developing countries. There has been large improvements in the number of people 
enrolling in higher education in recent years. Still, the WEF ranks the country as being the worst 
in terms of overall quality of higher education and training, out of the countries in their survey 
(WEF 2014). The country’s poor education score can be chalked down to two main reasons that 
are closely related to each other: (i) the civil war, and (ii) its young population. With the first 
leaving the educational infrastructure in tatters.  
The challenge with having a large share of the population below the working-age is connected 
to the need for massive public investment to improve the quality of their education. With close 
to fifty percent of the population under the age of fifteen, the need for more teachers, schools, 
books, and transport, creates a massive demand for funding. Until recently the government did 
not show a large will to meet this demand, as public spending on education as a percentage of 
GDP has declined since the mid 1980’s. In the last years, however, there has been a rise in both 
public spending and private investment in the country’s education sector.  
We see here that developing the education sector needs both public- and private investment. 
This makes educational development especially vulnerable to a drop in public spending and 
changes in the investment climate. Considering how a drop in oil-prices affects the 
macroeconomic environment, we can tell that a reduction in oil-prices would have a negative 
effect on educational development in Angola.  However, the current projects aimed at 
expanding education avoid suffering the fate of the country’s infrastructure projects, as the 
revised national budget for 2015 includes a clause that inhibits the planned education 
expenditure from being included in the spending cuts.  
The local content literature highlights how LCPs develop the local capacity by establishing 
knowledge- and technology transfers between established actors and the domestic industry 
(Tordo 2013: xv). Local companies need to participate in segments of the petroleum industry 
where the technology input exceeds that of local capacity in order to benefit from these 
transfers. By developing education, a country can expand their local capacity to participate in 
technology-heavy production, and securing these technology transfers through participation. 
My interviews with Subsea7 and NCA/Oceaneering, shows how the lack of educated nationals 
does in fact limit domestic participation within the more advanced segments of the industry, as 
there are few local actors with the necessary competence.   
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The Angolan case provides a more general lesson for developing oil-exporters, as their low 
general education-level often acts as a barrier toward domestic participation. In her study of the 
Brazilian petroleum sector, Dunaeva (2013) found that the lack of sufficient domestic 
competence acts as a market barrier for both local labour and suppliers. Both Heum et al. 
(2011), and Nordås et al. (2003), also found that investment in education and skill development 
was beneficial in securing a competitive local industry base in Uganda, Nigeria and Malaysia. 
The need for a well-developed education sector means that oil-exporting countries need to 
invest in the sector to be able to reap the technological benefits from local content in the 
petroleum industry. This need for investment makes educational development dependent on the 
macroeconomic environment, and the conditions that affect public and private investment.  
Thus, I find the development of the education sector to be influenced by changes in the price of 
oil, through the oil-price’s effect on the macroeconomic environment. The extent of the 
investment climate’s influence on education is, however, in all probability much smaller for 
developed countries, whose economy is less dependent on oil-revenue than is the case for 
Angola.      
5.2.3.2 Local industrial capacity 
We see that there have been major improvements in Angolan industrial capacity following the 
recent boost to public spending on infrastructure. Additionally, the LCRs forcing foreign 
companies to adopt an Angolan partner company have increased the capabilities of the domestic 
industry. According to Tordo et al (2013), these foreign-domestic industrial linkages are the 
epitome of what LCPs aim to achieve. It is through these linkages that technology is transferred, 
and the domestic industry is introduced into the global network of suppliers attached to the 
established industry. The establishment of the domestic supplier database has assisted this 
process, creating an easy-access portal for IOCs looking for local suppliers and subcontractors. 
Angola has been successful in developing its local content in its petroleum industry through 
these measures. Figure 10 shows how technology transferred through FDI is ranked just slightly 
below average--just  ranking as number 117 out of 144 countries, but still at a much higher level 
than the overall technological readiness would imply.  
The country has obviously been able to improve its industrial capacity in the last ten years, but 
figure 11 shows a bleak picture of how this has translated into actual improvement of the local 
industry. Here we see that the local industry score is at the very bottom of the WEF survey, 
both in terms of quantity and quality of local suppliers. It seems that the success the country 
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has had in establishing industrial linkages, has yet to translate into substantial improvements of 
domestic capabilities. This might be explained by the lack of educational development, as we 
have seen how this affects both the breadth of domestic participation, and the domestic ability 
to absorb technology. The narrow range of domestic participation is evident from looking at 
figure 10. Here we see the country ranks at the very bottom of the survey in this regard, as the 
Angolan presence is primarily concerned with individual steps in the industry’s value chain.  
Lastly, figure 11 provides one last indication of how well the industrial linkages have 
contributed to developing Angolan local content. Even as Angola has a few industrialized areas 
outside Luanda, such as Lobito and Cabinda, the country has been unable to establish industrial 
clusters, which are viewed as competitiveness enhancers for the companies involved (Brown 
2000: 4-6). The development of industrial clusters are one of the reasons for the success of 
Norwegian local content in the petroleum industry. In Norway a total of eight such clusters 
exist, each centred around a specific segment of the petroleum industry (KonKraft 2014). These 
Norwegian clusters typically consist of one or two large companies, which serve like a hub for 
the smaller companies that supply them (KonKraft 2008). This creates a network of companies, 
in addition to establishing synergy effects that increase the scale of their combined production. 
These effects contribute to boosting efficiency and profitability of the cluster, as diversified 
production and efficient logistics enable specialization and decrease production costs. The story 
of Norway’s cluster development also shows that it is often the large international companies 
in a segment that become the main hubs in a cluster (KonKraft 2008).  
This suggests that the foreign companies that have established themselves in Angola through 
these industrial linkages, might eventually be able to develop a surrounding cluster of suppliers. 
This way they could add to the development of local content, if the country were able to create 
an environment that is conducive to foreign investment and local participation. 
5.2.3.3 The oil-price effect and local capabilities  
The Angolan case shows how local content regulations can enable developing oil-exporting 
countries to secure industrial links between domestic companies and the established 
international industry. These links create benefits that the local content literature finds to be 
extremely important for the development of a competitive local petroleum industry. This is 
because such links: (i) create technology transfers, (ii) introduce local companies to 
international supply networks, and (iii) establish links to the domestic non-petroleum based 
industry. However, to capture these benefits to local development, there needs to be some 
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degree of domestic participation in the more technically demanding operations. We see that a 
failure to secure the necessary education and training is detrimental to local participation in 
these areas of the industry. This is also apparent when examining the Angolan case, where we 
see that the general education level is poorly developed. This limits the domestic capacity to 
absorb the inflow of technology brought by foreign companies investing in the Angolan market. 
In addition to a solid education sector, the ability of the local industry to become a part of the 
foreign MNCs supply networks also relies on the local infrastructure and the competitiveness 
of local suppliers. These are domestic variables that we have seen are heavily influenced by the 
macroeconomic environment, through its reliance on public and private investment. This makes 
the extent of the local industry’s ability to secure local content development, dependent on how 
these variables are affected by a change in the investment climate. A short-term drop in 
investment in the infrastructure and education sectors, caused by a temporary fall in the oil-
price, might not cause an immediate effect on the local capacity. However, funding public 
expenditures in these sectors by removing fuel-subsidies does have a short-term negative effect 
on competitiveness, as I have already discussed. Additionally, as public expenditure retracts 
with a declining oil-price, we would expect a sustained fall in oil-prices to have long-term 
repercussions for the ability of the local industry to absorb technology and expertise from the 
established international companies. 
5.1.4 Local policies 
In the conceptual model, the local policies that benefit local content development are those who 
promote domestic input and industry linkages in the petroleum industry. Kazzazi and Nouri 
(2012) specifically highlight the establishment of company registers, as well as creating 
infrastructure development, as example of such policies. As these measures are further 
discussed in the local capabilities- and local infrastructure sections respectively, this section of 
the analysis will focus on Angolan regulatory policies, their effectiveness in enhancing local 
content development, and whether the ability to enhance this development is affected by a fall 
in the oil-price.  
5.2.4.1 Securing direct and indirect local content benefits 
Figure 12 summarizes how the different laws and decrees imposed on IOCs and their 
subcontractors create opportunities for local participation. Here we can see that the Angolan 
local content regulations create opportunities for the development of both direct- and indirect 
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local content. The minimum requirements for employment of nationals, and the need for 
government approval of work visas for expatriates, makes it necessary for foreign companies 
to train nationals. This process of developing direct local participation is assisted by the tax- 
and import duty deductions on the training equipment used by foreign companies to train local 
workers. 
As for indirect local content, the creation of different service-categories with varying 
requirements for local participation helps local companies secure a minimum of subcontractor 
contracts. It also provides local companies with an incentive to improve their capabilities and 
competitiveness, as they will be preferred over foreign suppliers if they are able to provide 
equal services to their international competition. Additionally, the ten percent preference 
margin on local supplies and suppliers enables local companies to compete for contracts even 
before they are internationally competitive. From an infant industries perspective, this is 
beneficial for developing local competence and future competitiveness. This is provided they 
could supply a product with the same quality as non-Angolan companies. However, this might 
create a scenario where local companies are unable to compete for contracts in certain segments, 
as they are unable to match the quality of international companies in the more capital- and 
technology-intensive supply categories. 
The remedy for this qualitative gap is found in article 27 of the Oil activities law 10/2004, which 
states that licensees should make use of local service providers as long as they provide a similar 
service at a ten percent price preference. Without specifying any quality benchmarks, this opens 
the door for less competitive local service providers to participate in the more technology-
intensive industry segments. By creating opportunities for local employment and local 
industrial participation, the Angolan regulatory regime provides both direct and indirect local 
content benefits. 
Still there is the question of how the local policies contribute to the competitiveness of the 
domestic industry. In the conceptual model, Kazzazi and Nouri point out that policies aimed at 
enhancing local content, should foster competitive local participation. We see that through its 
protectionist regulations, the Angolan industry is insulated from direct competition from 
foreign firms, especially in the areas of the industry where they have the technological capacity 
to participate. The infant-industry case for protection argues that a new company or industry, 
will not be competitive initially, but after a period of protection it might develop a competitive 
capacity (Oatley 2012: 91). In the case of Angola, one could see how this argument might be 
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used to justify its comprehensive regulatory regime. After decades of civil war, and the general 
backwards technological development of the region, the goal of protection should then be to 
achieve competitiveness through the development of experience and production of scale.  
By looking at the score that the country’s supply sector got in WEFs survey in figure 11, we 
see that this protectionist policy has yet to create competitive local suppliers. This might be 
explained by the lack of domestic ability to absorb the spill-overs in technology and experience 
from working with the established industry. Still, just like the country in general, the Angolan 
petroleum industry is developing its capabilities, and through its industrial linkages, it might 
benefit from these protectionist policy.  
5.2.4.2 Petroleum production agreements and bargaining power 
The use of PSAs and RSAs that include Sonangol as a production partner create an opportunity 
for local participation in the various oil fields. Sonangol has a share in all but three of Angola’s 
44 concession blocks (Sonangol 2014). These kind of agreements are negotiated individually, 
making them flexible, and in some cases, containing heavier local content demands than the 
initial framework might require. This suggest that future PSAs might also contain less demand 
for local participation depending on changes in the bargaining position of the government and 
the IOCs. This flexibility in allowing local content demands being attached to the PSA, means 
that these demands could be adjusted to attract more investment if need be. According to my 
interview with Subsea7, such a downward adjustment of local content demands is exactly what 
has happened as the fall in oil-prices deteriorated the investment climate. 
This relaxation of local content regulations might imply that there has been a shift in bargaining 
position between the government and the MNCs in the petroleum industry. While the literature 
suggest that MNCs have an advantage when negotiating with developing countries (Letnes 
2002: 38). The mechanism of obsolescent bargaining suggest that this relationship changes after 
the investment have been made. This happens because investment are often non-reversible, so 
for the investing company this capital is sunk into the investment location, leaving it at the 
mercy of government regulation (Jakobsen 2012: 70). Companies investing in the extraction of 
natural resources seem to be especially vulnerable to the effects of obsolescent bargaining (Ibid: 
74).  
My interview data suggest that as the macroeconomic environment deteriorate, this bargaining 
relationship again changes in favour of the MNCs, because the country’s petroleum sector has 
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become a less profitable investment target. However, my industry interviews also show that 
there is a difference between international companies with and without a degree of domestic 
attachment. This suggest that whatever relaxation of the Angolan push for local content we see, 
it is limited to companies that already have sunk costs in the country.  
The Angolan policy of negotiating petroleum contracts on a block-by-block basis means that 
the bargaining position between the government and IOCs plays a part in how they are shaped. 
The investment climate then influences this bargaining position, by creating an advantage for 
the government in a high-profit environment, as demand is on the side of the resource holding 
state. Reversely, a low-profit environment would create an advantage for the IOCs, as the 
resource holding state would have to create investment incentives for the industry. As the local 
content regulations attached to the petroleum contracts add significant costs to the IOCs and 
their suppliers, this change in bargaining position could have future repercussions for local 
procurement among international companies. This is because one would expect petroleum 
agreements in a low-price scenario to contain fewer expenses for international companies, such 
as using inefficient local suppliers.  
5.2.4.3 The oil-price effect and local policy 
The Angolan case illustrates how comprehensive industry regulations can be used to increase 
the local content level in a domestic petroleum industry. We see that by applying regulatory 
policies (such as minimum employment requirements, tax and tariff deductions, preference 
margins, and mandatory use of local capacities) the country has been able to secure both direct- 
and indirect local content. According to Tordo et al (2013), we would expect this to add to the 
development of both local capacity, and the overall economy. The data reviewed in this paper 
does however suggest that the expected boost to competitiveness that justify these protectionist 
policies, are yet to materialize. Creating added costs for the established industry, without the 
expected return to local development. 
These regulations are introduced to the IOCs and their international suppliers through the 
various production agreements. As these agreements are negotiated on a block-by-block basis, 
they are likely to be influenced by the bargaining position between the government, in Angola’s 
case Sonangol, and the IOCs. The data presented in this paper, suggest that changes in the 
investment climate can cause a shift in bargaining power between the two. Where a profitable 
investment climate, caused by high oil-prices, will help strengthen the government’s bargaining 
position, as the demand for its resources rise. The interview data capture the opposite reverse 
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effect, where a decline in oil-prices reduce profitability, which lowers demand for the countries 
resources, and thus strengthens the bargaining position of the IOCs. As the local content 
regulations add significant costs and limited return for the foreign companies, one would expect 
these production agreements to contain less local content obligations in a low-price scenario.  
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Chapter 6. Discussion 
The resource curse literature emphasises how countries might counteract an onset of the curse 
by developing local content in the resource sector. The reason being that it is one of the most 
effective ways resource-rich countries can make their resources contributes to domestic growth. 
We have here seen how both direct- and indirect domestic participation contribute to creating 
increased domestic demand- and employment throughout the various sectors of the domestic 
economy. By looking at Angola, we see that local content regulations increase this effect. 
Because they, by restricting the access of foreign companies to the domestic market, create 
incentives for foreign companies to invest domestically. This has a favourable impact on 
domestic industrial capacity, as investments bring in new technology and opportunities for local 
suppliers. However, we also find that the ability of the host-country to absorb these local content 
benefits depend on the country’s capacity to supply qualified labour and suppliers.  
The theoretical arguments for local content regulations are strong, especially for developing 
oil-exporting countries. These countries often have a limited industrial base, while the major 
IOCs often have an established network of international suppliers, who come into direct 
competition with domestic suppliers. The expertise and experienced required for technology-
intensive operations, such as deep-water oil production, does not make developing local 
capabilities the most cost-effective option from an industry perspective. From the interviews I 
have conducted in my research for this paper, it is evident that local content regulations do 
impose significant added costs on the foreign companies operating on the Angolan petroleum 
industry. So much so, that it effectively keeps out all but the largest IOCs and international 
supply companies. The theory behind the investment strategy of multinational companies tells 
us that the main underlying reasoning for investment is profit maximisation. While one could 
argue that investment in a new location for oil- and gas production is market-seeking behaviour, 
the bottom line is still to increase the company’s revenue stream. The consequence of applying 
comprehensive local content regulations are exactly this, a trade-off between creating 
investment in the domestic economy, and making the market less profitable by increasing the 
expenses of the industry. The negative effects from this trade-off is, however, only temporary, 
since local content regulations will naturally ease up as the domestic industry matures. This 
trade-off becomes important when the price of the resource declines, as the influence of added-
costs on the industry’s overall profitability and willingness to invest, grows as prices fall.  
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In this case study, I find that a decline in oil-prices does lead to a deterioration of the conditions 
for private investment in Angola’s petroleum industry. As we see from my analysis, a fall in 
investment has a major impact on the different variables in the conceptual model, and their 
ability to contribute to local content development. More specifically, we see that a drop in oil-
prices influences the macroeconomic environment in a way that limits investment and 
development of the domestic- infrastructure and industrial capacity. Previous drops in oil-prices 
have led to exchange-rate depreciation, increased inflationary pressure, and a rise in public debt 
in the Angolan economy. This further deteriorates the domestic investment climate, as it 
increases domestic production-costs, makes loans more expensive, and curtails public spending. 
Lastly, we see this drop in investment also affects the government’s ability to impose local 
content regulations, as the need to reduce added-costs on the industry undermine its bargaining 
position. However, my interviews only found this last point to be true for companies who 
already have considerable sunk-costs in Angola, which might suggest that this will have a 
limited impact on Angolan content. 
As I find the price of oil to influence Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model, either directly or 
indirectly, I suggest that the model should be expanded to include an external Oil-price effect 
variable. However, as oil production can be profitable at a low price in some areas and not in 
others, due to the amount of technical input required this variable needs to base itself on the 
profit margin of the international companies. In addition to the profit margin, we need to add 
the effect of added costs, such as taxes and expenses related to local content regulations. We 
are then left with a variable consisting of the profit margin on one side, and added costs on the 
other. Following the logic of what I have found in this paper, we can then expect a reduction in 
oil-price to reduce investment in the domestic capacity for long-term local content 
development. The conceptual model will then look something like this: 
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Figure 13. Kazzazi and Nouri's conceptual model, revised to include the oil-price variable and 
interaction effects 
 
In this revised model, I have added two new interaction effects, and this fifth variable. The first 
interaction effect, is the local environments influence on the infrastructure’s ability to supply 
local content. As I found the environment to be more directly linked to the infrastructures 
capacity to promote local content than the oposite, which is how its presented in the original 
model. The second interaction effect, is the local enviornments influence on the ability of local 
policy to promote local content development. In this case-study of Angola, I found the 
macroeconomic aspect of the local environment to influence how decision-makers prioritised 
local content regulations. In the original model this interaction was one-way, only including the 
way policies influence the macroeconomic environment. Lastly, there is the oil-price variable, 
which influence the way policies, infrastructure, and capabilities, are able contribute to local 
content development, through its effect on the macroeconomic environment.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
This case study of the Angolan petroleum industry has attempted to answer four hypotheses 
regarding the influence of oil-price fluctuations on local content development. This has been 
carried out through analysing data collected in interviews with selected industry 
representatives, and the use of independent statistical databases. The aim of these hypotheses 
have been to answer the research question; How does a fall in global oil-prices affect the ability 
of petroleum producing countries to develop local content in the petroleum industry? 
To answer its research question, this paper has based its hypotheses on the variables in Kazzazi 
and Nouri’s conceptual model for local content development. The hypotheses examine the link 
between the oil-prices, macroeconomic factors, and the ability of these variables to contribute 
to local content development.  
 The first hypothesis was: A fall in oil-prices affect important macroeconomic variables 
in the resource holding state, in a way that deteriorates the domestic investment climate. 
 This paper finds this hypothesis to be true for Angola. By causing an exchange-rate 
depreciation, and the government to borrow money to finance the national budget, a significant 
fall in oil-prices contributes to curbing domestic investment. This is because these effects add 
to the inflationary pressure in the economy, and increase interest rates, both of which discourage 
private investment. In addition to influencing private investment, this paper also find that by 
negatively affecting government revenue, a drop in oil-prices cause public investment to decline 
as well. 
 The second hypothesis was: The macroeconomic effects from a fall in oil-prices will 
limit the resource holding state’s ability to impose LCRs on foreign companies that are 
established domestically.  
The findings in this paper suggest that this is indeed the case, at least in the case of international 
companies with sunk costs in the domestic industry. As the local content obligations imposed 
on these companies in Angola has decreased substantially after the prices fell in the summer of 
2014. This suggest that the bargaining position between the international petroleum industry 
and the resource-holding government experienced a shift in favour of the industry, following a 
drop in oil-prices. This poses as a restraint on the government’s ability to impose added costs 
on the industry. However, this effect was not present for companies who do not have the same 
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level of sunk-costs. This suggest that the effect on bargaining position might have a limited 
impact on local content development, as companies with sunk-costs already have a large stake 
in developing local capacity. 
 The third hypothesis was: The macroeconomic effects from a fall in oil-prices will cause 
a decrease in government spending on infrastructure and subsidies for domestic 
companies.  
This paper finds that in the case of Angola, a deterioration of the macroeconomic environment 
has an adverse effect on the infrastructure’s ability to contribute to local content development. 
This is caused by the negative effect a low oil-price has on public spending and the 
competitiveness of the local industry. I found that public funds for infrastructure improvement 
have been lost, due to decreased oil-revenues, and that new funding has to be freed up by 
removing fuel-subsidies. A move that will increase the production-cost of local suppliers. 
 The last hypothesis was: The macroeconomic effects from a fall in oil-prices will cause 
a drop in public funding of education and public measures aimed at increasing the 
competitiveness of the domestic industry.  
This paper also find this hypothesis to be true, as a decrease in public spending on expanding 
education and local industrial capacity will have long-term effects on the domestic ability to 
absorb the benefits from local participation. This is because the local industry requires a certain 
level of advanced capacity in order to effectively cooperate with the established international 
industry, and secure technology transfers. In the case of Angola, the data analysed in this paper 
suggest that a lack of advanced local capacity does limit effective cooperation between the 
foreign- and the domestic industry. A drop in public investment does nothing to improve this 
situation, and the removal of fuel-subsidies will decrease, rather than increase, the 
competitiveness of the local industry. 
As all four of the hypotheses are confirmed in the case of Angola, I contend that a fall in oil-
prices has a negative impact on the ability of petroleum producing countries to develop their 
local content. This implies an affirmative answer to the paper’s research question. From this 
follows certain implications for Kazzazi and Nouri’s conceptual model. This paper finds that 
the price-effect does influence all the different variables in the model’s ability to contribute to 
local content development, through its effect on the macroeconomic environment. Therefore, I 
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conclude that a variable encapsulating the ratio between oil-prices and profit margins should be 
incorporated into the conceptual model, as shown in Figure 13. 
As a new period of Angola’s participation in the OfD programme is about to commence, this 
case study has also attempted to provide some insight into the challenges related to current 
management practices. We see that there is certainly a need to reduce the impact of oil-price 
fluctuations on the economy. This is something that could be achieved by reshaping the 
country’s petroleum fund in the image of the Norwegian pension fund, with its stabilising 
function, and increased focus on long-term profitability. In addition to this, it is evident from 
the massive budget deficits (that followed the fall in oil-prices in both 2008 and 2014) that there 
is need for budgetary reform in Angola. 
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Appendix 
 
 
A1. Interview guide for service companies, Angola 
In this interview guide I have highlighted the questions in bold, and then added notes after 
each question as to clarify what I am asking, and to give some extra considerations for the 
informant. I hope you find the time to answer these questions, and feel free to give broad 
answer and provide pointers if you feel like there is an important aspect of your companies 
local content considerations which have not been considered. 
Questions regarding this interview guide can be directed to email: sigvehassel@gmail.com, 
phone: +47 92628839. 
 
 
Introduction 
A. Presentation; 
A1. I would like the interviewee to present himself/herself by providing some 
information about (i) what is their position in the company, (ii) how long they 
have worked for the company, (iii) what is your connections to the company’s 
operations in Angola, and (iv) in what way do you come into contact with 
considerations regarding local content? 
 
A2. In addition to the presentation of the interviewee, give an account of which 
sort of operations [company] have in the Angolan petroleum sector. 
 
B. How would you define local content? 
The definition of Local content can simply be the percentage of nationals employed by 
a company, but it could also relate to programmes for development, or a company’s 
use of local subcontractors. Which definition of local content does your company 
operate with in relation to their operations in Angola? 
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Local content considerations 
C. Can you tell me about the specific rules for the use of local content, that are (or 
previously have been), imposed on your company’s operations in Angola? 
By operations, I mean all aspects of the company’s operations from qualifying 
for the initial contract and licence to operate, to the procurement for 
[company]’s operations in Angola, and employment. 
D. These questions are aimed at what kind of measures [your company] have 
specifically aimed at developing local content in Angola? 
 
D2. Does your efforts focus on the use of Angolan labour and subcontractors, 
or do they aim towards programmes for education and training. Or Perhaps 
both? 
D3.  What is your experience with the use of Angolan nationals in managerial 
and executive positions?  
D4. Does [company] have an Angolan partner company? 
 
More broadly, I wonder if [company] have any corporate policy directed at 
local content development regardless of government local content policy. (like 
some companies have a specific CSR profile). 
 
E. Would you say that there are any strategic considerations affecting the industry’s 
local content measures? 
In regards to corporate social responsibility, but also, in regards to the 
awarding of contracts and licences. I am wondering how you perceives 
local content laws in terms affecting market access and ease of 
business.  
 
E2.  Do you perceive non-Angolan companies operating in the Angolan 
petroleum sector, as using local content measures as a strategic tool to gain 
market access? 
E1.2. Or as their corporate social responsibility? 
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F. From a financial perspective, how does local content measures affect the company’s 
operations in Angola? 
I wonder how you perceives any positive (such as improved logistics, lower 
wages ect), or negative (training costs ect) financial implications resulting 
from the adoption of local content measures. 
 
F1. Does local content regulations affect [company]’s investment decisions? In 
 relation to the changing oil price. 
In regards to the decreasing oil prices, (i) does this affect your perception of the 
cost of local content measures, and (ii) does this make a less regulated markets 
more attractive for investment?  
 
G. What do you perceive as the pros and cons for the companies operating in the 
petroleum related industry, concerning substantial government local content 
regulations? 
 
In terms of procurement from domestic supplier/subcontractors, if there are any 
issues with competence, and can you see the regulations having any effect in 
the development of the Angolan industry.  Do you perceive such regulations as 
a barrier to market entry for smaller companies?  
 
Finishing questions 
H. Are there any specific local content measures that you know of, that you would like 
to highlight as positive for the development of the Angolan petroleum related 
industry? 
 
Perhaps a specific programme aimed at work training, scholarships, or 
investment in the Angolan industry and infrastructure. 
 
I. How will [company] continue to work towards realizing their local content 
commitments and social responsibilities in general, and in Angola in particular? 
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